Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Reiss,J/Spreger,J, Nuel D. Belnap and Joseph Butler

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17 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger]
An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger]
Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger]
The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger]
Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger]
Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Everything is what it is, and not another thing [Butler]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
Read 'all ravens are black' as about ravens, not as about an implication [Belnap]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Analytic explanation is wholes in terms of parts; synthetic is parts in terms of wholes or contexts [Belnap]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 5. Concerns of the Self
If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Butler exalts conscience, but it may be horribly misleading [Anscombe on Butler]