21 ideas
6601 | Science rules the globe because of colonising power, not inherent rationality [Feyerabend] |
22353 | One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22356 | An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22359 | Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22360 | The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22362 | Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22364 | Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger] |
10653 | Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi] |
10659 | There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi] |
10648 | Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi] |
10655 | Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi] |
10661 | 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi] |
10654 | The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi] |
10647 | Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi] |
10649 | 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi] |
10651 | If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi] |
10658 | Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi] |
10652 | Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi] |
22357 | The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger] |
2561 | For Feyerabend the meaning of a term depends on a whole theory [Feyerabend, by Rorty] |
22365 | The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger] |