27 ideas
22353 | One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22356 | An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22359 | Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22360 | The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22362 | Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22364 | Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger] |
17596 | Coherence problems have positive and negative restraints; solutions maximise constraint satisfaction [Thagard] |
17597 | Coherence is explanatory, deductive, conceptual, analogical, perceptual, and deliberative [Thagard] |
17598 | Explanatory coherence needs symmetry,explanation,analogy,data priority, contradiction,competition,acceptance [Thagard] |
17602 | Verisimilitude comes from including more phenomena, and revealing what underlies [Thagard] |
16052 | 'Superdupervenience' is supervenience that has a robustly materialistic explanation [Horgan,T] |
16053 | 'Global' supervenience is facts tracking varying physical facts in every possible world [Horgan,T] |
16056 | Don't just observe supervenience - explain it! [Horgan,T] |
16054 | Physicalism needs more than global supervenience on the physical [Horgan,T] |
16055 | Materialism requires that physics be causally complete [Horgan,T] |
22357 | The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger] |
17601 | Neither a priori rationalism nor sense data empiricism account for scientific knowledge [Thagard] |
16057 | Instrumentalism normally says some discourse is useful, but not genuinely true [Horgan,T] |
17600 | Bayesian inference is forced to rely on approximations [Thagard] |
22365 | The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger] |
17065 | 2: An explanation must wholly cohere internally, and with the new fact [Thagard, by Smart] |
17066 | 3: If an analogous pair explain another analogous pair, then they all cohere [Thagard, by Smart] |
17064 | 1: Coherence is a symmetrical relation between two propositions [Thagard, by Smart] |
17067 | 4: For coherence, observation reports have a degree of intrinsic acceptability [Thagard, by Smart] |
17068 | 5: Contradictory propositions incohere [Thagard, by Smart] |
17069 | 6: A proposition's acceptability depends on its coherence with a system [Thagard, by Smart] |
17599 | The best theory has the highest subjective (Bayesian) probability? [Thagard] |