Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Reiss,J/Spreger,J, Robert Fogelin and C.I. Lewis

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45 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy may never find foundations, and may undermine our lives in the process [Fogelin]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Rationality is threatened by fear of inconsistency, illusions of absolutes or relativism, and doubt [Fogelin]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger]
An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger]
Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger]
The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger]
Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger]
Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Humans may never be able to attain a world view which is both rich and consistent [Fogelin]
A game can be played, despite having inconsistent rules [Fogelin]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
The law of noncontradiction is traditionally the most basic principle of rationality [Fogelin]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
The law of noncontradiction makes the distinction between asserting something and denying it [Fogelin]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Legal reasoning is analogical, not deductive [Fogelin]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
The simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is Lewis's S5 [Lewis,CI, by Girle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Lewis,CI, by Read]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
Modal logic began with translation difficulties for 'If...then' [Lewis,CI, by Girle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
My view is 'circumspect rationalism' - that only our intellect can comprehend the world [Fogelin]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI]
If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
Knowledge is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Scepticism is cartesian (sceptical scenarios), or Humean (future), or Pyrrhonian (suspend belief) [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Scepticism deals in remote possibilities that are ineliminable and set the standard very high [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
We are also irrational, with a unique ability to believe in bizarre self-created fictions [Fogelin]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Critics must be causally entangled with their subject matter [Fogelin]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The word 'beautiful', when deprived of context, is nearly contentless [Fogelin]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
Saying 'It's all a matter to taste' ignores the properties of the object discussed [Fogelin]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Cynics are committed to morality, but disappointed or disgusted by human failings [Fogelin]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution can come into conflict in punishments [Fogelin]
Retributivists say a crime can be 'paid for'; deterrentists still worry about potential victims [Fogelin]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI]