126 ideas
| 13310 | Wisdom does not lie in books, and unread people can also become wise [Seneca] |
| 13560 | A wise man is not subservient to anything [Seneca] |
| 13295 | Wise people escape necessity by willing it [Seneca] |
| 13317 | Philosophy aims at happiness [Seneca] |
| 13293 | What philosophy offers humanity is guidance [Seneca] |
| 9408 | Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists [Mumford] |
| 13309 | That something is a necessary condition of something else doesn't mean it caused it [Seneca] |
| 13313 | Even philosophers have got bogged down in analysing tiny bits of language [Seneca] |
| 9429 | Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid [Mumford] |
| 22353 | One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22356 | An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22359 | Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22360 | The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22362 | Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22364 | Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 9427 | For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events [Mumford] |
| 14334 | Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford] |
| 14306 | Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford] |
| 14333 | Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford] |
| 14336 | Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford] |
| 14315 | Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford] |
| 14332 | There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford] |
| 14302 | A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford] |
| 9446 | Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford] |
| 14294 | Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford] |
| 14310 | Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford] |
| 14317 | I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford] |
| 14316 | If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford] |
| 14313 | All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford] |
| 14318 | Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford] |
| 14293 | Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford] |
| 14326 | Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford] |
| 14298 | Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford] |
| 14314 | If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford] |
| 14325 | Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford] |
| 14312 | Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford] |
| 14291 | Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford] |
| 14299 | There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford] |
| 14323 | If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford] |
| 14328 | Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford] |
| 14331 | Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford] |
| 9435 | A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford] |
| 9447 | If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford] |
| 18617 | Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford] |
| 14295 | Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford] |
| 12248 | How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford] |
| 18618 | Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality [Mumford] |
| 18619 | Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely [Mumford] |
| 18620 | Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more [Mumford] |
| 14309 | Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford] |
| 14311 | Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford] |
| 22357 | The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22365 | The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 13297 | To the four causes Plato adds a fifth, the idea which guided the event [Seneca] |
| 14319 | Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford] |
| 14342 | General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford] |
| 14322 | If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford] |
| 14337 | Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford] |
| 14343 | To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford] |
| 14320 | Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford] |
| 14324 | Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford] |
| 13307 | If everything can be measured, try measuring the size of a man's soul [Seneca] |
| 21399 | Referring to a person, and speaking about him, are very different [Seneca] |
| 13558 | The supreme good is harmony of spirit [Seneca] |
| 13325 | Trouble in life comes from copying other people, which is following convention instead of reason [Seneca] |
| 22239 | Humans acquired the concept of virtue from an analogy with bodily health and strength [Seneca, by Allen] |
| 13294 | We know death, which is like before birth; ceasing to be and never beginning are the same [Seneca] |
| 13299 | Living is nothing wonderful; what matters is to die well [Seneca] |
| 13300 | It is as silly to lament ceasing to be as to lament not having lived in the remote past [Seneca] |
| 13321 | Is anything sweeter than valuing yourself more when you find you are loved? [Seneca] |
| 13292 | Selfishness does not produce happiness; to live for yourself, live for others [Seneca] |
| 13550 | To be always happy is to lack knowledge of one half of nature [Seneca] |
| 13303 | A man is as unhappy as he has convinced himself he is [Seneca] |
| 13302 | Life is like a play - it is the quality that matters, not the length [Seneca] |
| 13301 | We are scared of death - except when we are immersed in pleasure! [Seneca] |
| 13323 | The whole point of pleasure-seeking is novelty, and abandoning established ways [Seneca] |
| 13318 | Nature doesn't give us virtue; we must unremittingly pursue it, as a training and an art [Seneca] |
| 13324 | Living contrary to nature is like rowing against the stream [Seneca] |
| 13559 | I seek virtue, because it is its own reward [Seneca] |
| 13554 | True greatness is never allowing events to disturb you [Seneca] |
| 13305 | Character is ruined by not looking back over our pasts, since the future rests on the past [Seneca] |
| 13561 | Virtue is always moderate, so excess need not be feared [Seneca] |
| 13562 | It is shameful to not even recognise your own slaves [Seneca] |
| 13556 | Every night I critically review how I have behaved during the day [Seneca] |
| 13308 | It's no good winning lots of fights, if you are then conquered by your own temper [Seneca] |
| 13553 | Anger is a vice which afflicts good men as well as bad [Seneca] |
| 13312 | Excessive curiosity is a form of intemperance [Seneca] |
| 13552 | Anger is an extreme vice, threatening sanity, and gripping whole states [Seneca] |
| 13549 | Nothing bad can happen to a good man [Seneca] |
| 13563 | Why does your wife wear in her ears the income of a wealthy house? [Seneca] |
| 13565 | If wealth was a good, it would make men good [Seneca] |
| 13564 | There is far more scope for virtue if you are wealthy; poverty only allows endurance [Seneca] |
| 13315 | To govern used to mean to serve, not to rule; rulers did not test their powers over those who bestowed it [Seneca] |
| 13557 | Unfortunately the majority do not tend to favour what is best [Seneca] |
| 13290 | One joy of learning is making teaching possible [Seneca] |
| 13322 | Both teachers and pupils should aim at one thing - the improvement of the pupil [Seneca] |
| 13298 | Suicide may be appropriate even when it is not urgent, if there are few reasons against it [Seneca] |
| 13319 | If we control our own death, no one has power over us [Seneca] |
| 13320 | Sometimes we have a duty not to commit suicide, for those we love [Seneca] |
| 14344 | Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford] |
| 19068 | Causation interests us because we want to explain change [Mumford] |
| 9430 | Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford] |
| 9445 | We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford] |
| 9443 | It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford] |
| 14338 | In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford] |
| 9444 | There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements [Mumford] |
| 14339 | Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford] |
| 14341 | Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford] |
| 9441 | Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role [Mumford] |
| 14340 | It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford] |
| 9431 | Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions [Mumford] |
| 9416 | Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances! [Mumford] |
| 9415 | Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B? [Mumford] |
| 9422 | If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description [Mumford] |
| 9421 | The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them [Mumford] |
| 9432 | Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford] |
| 9433 | If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford] |
| 14345 | The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford] |
| 9434 | Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds [Mumford] |
| 14307 | Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford] |
| 9437 | To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds [Mumford] |
| 9439 | The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern [Mumford] |
| 9412 | You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert [Mumford] |
| 9411 | There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton [Mumford] |
| 13548 | The ocean changes in volume in proportion to the attraction of the moon [Seneca] |
| 13311 | Does time exist on its own? Did anything precede it? Did it pre-exist the cosmos? [Seneca] |