17 ideas
| 22353 | One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22356 | An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22359 | Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22360 | The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22362 | Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22364 | Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 16700 | In order to speak about time and successive entities, the 'present' must be enlarged [Wycliff] |
| 16701 | To be successive a thing needs parts, which must therefore be lodged outside that instant [Wycliff] |
| 19718 | Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann] |
| 19717 | Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann] |
| 19716 | Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann] |
| 19715 | You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann] |
| 19713 | Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann] |
| 19714 | Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann] |
| 19719 | 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann] |
| 22357 | The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22365 | The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger] |