371 ideas
7504 | Modern science comes from Descartes' view that knowledge doesn't need moral purity [Descartes, by Foucault] |
3600 | Slow and accurate thought makes the greatest progress [Descartes] |
3656 | The greatest good for a state is true philosophers [Descartes] |
24032 | Clever scholars can obscure things which are obvious even to peasants [Descartes] |
3601 | Most things in human life seem vain and useless [Descartes] |
3602 | Almost every daft idea has been expressed by some philosopher [Descartes] |
21962 | Metaphysics is the roots of the tree of science [Descartes] |
24033 | Most scholastic disputes concern words, where agreeing on meanings would settle them [Descartes] |
3653 | My Meditations are the complete foundation of my physics [Descartes] |
1569 | Descartes impoverished the classical idea of logos, and it no longer covered human experience [Roochnik on Descartes] |
24024 | The secret of the method is to recognise which thing in a series is the simplest [Descartes] |
3603 | Methodical thinking is cautious, analytical, systematic, and panoramic [Descartes, by PG] |
2248 | Reason says don't assent to uncertain principles, just as much as totally false ones [Descartes] |
24018 | One truth leads us to another [Descartes] |
10237 | Coherence is a primitive, intuitive notion, not reduced to something formal [Shapiro] |
2857 | Since Plato all philosophers have followed the herd, except Descartes, stuck in superficial reason [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
10204 | An 'implicit definition' gives a direct description of the relations of an entity [Shapiro] |
3641 | It is circular to make truth depend on believing God's existence is true [Arnauld on Descartes] |
4524 | Descartes is right that in the Christian view only God can guarantee the reliability of senses [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
3612 | Clear and distinct conceptions are true because a perfect God exists [Descartes] |
2290 | Once it is clear that there is a God who is no deceiver, I conclude that clear and distinct perceptions must be true [Descartes] |
3659 | I know the truth that God exists and is the author of truth [Descartes] |
4736 | Truth is such a transcendentally clear notion that it cannot be further defined [Descartes] |
3610 | Truth is clear and distinct conception - of which it is hard to be sure [Descartes] |
2266 | My general rule is that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly is true [Descartes] |
4301 | Someone may think a thing is 'clear and distinct', but be wrong [Leibniz on Descartes] |
4298 | All items of possible human knowledge are interconnected, and can be reached by inference [Descartes] |
13634 | Satisfaction is 'truth in a model', which is a model of 'truth' [Shapiro] |
13643 | Aristotelian logic is complete [Shapiro] |
10206 | Modal operators are usually treated as quantifiers [Shapiro] |
13651 | A set is 'transitive' if contains every member of each of its members [Shapiro] |
13647 | Choice is essential for proving downward Löwenheim-Skolem [Shapiro] |
10208 | Axiom of Choice: some function has a value for every set in a given set [Shapiro] |
10252 | The Axiom of Choice seems to license an infinite amount of choosing [Shapiro] |
10301 | The axiom of choice is controversial, but it could be replaced [Shapiro] |
13631 | Are sets part of logic, or part of mathematics? [Shapiro] |
13654 | It is central to the iterative conception that membership is well-founded, with no infinite descending chains [Shapiro] |
13640 | Russell's paradox shows that there are classes which are not iterative sets [Shapiro] |
13666 | Iterative sets are not Boolean; the complement of an iterative set is not an iterative sets [Shapiro] |
13653 | 'Well-ordering' of a set is an irreflexive, transitive, and binary relation with a least element [Shapiro] |
10207 | Anti-realists reject set theory [Shapiro] |
13627 | There is no 'correct' logic for natural languages [Shapiro] |
13642 | Logic is the ideal for learning new propositions on the basis of others [Shapiro] |
13668 | Bernays (1918) formulated and proved the completeness of propositional logic [Shapiro] |
13669 | Can one develop set theory first, then derive numbers, or are numbers more basic? [Shapiro] |
13667 | Skolem and Gödel championed first-order, and Zermelo, Hilbert, and Bernays championed higher-order [Shapiro] |
13662 | First-order logic was an afterthought in the development of modern logic [Shapiro] |
13624 | The 'triumph' of first-order logic may be related to logicism and the Hilbert programme, which failed [Shapiro] |
13660 | Maybe compactness, semantic effectiveness, and the Löwenheim-Skolem properties are desirable [Shapiro] |
13673 | The notion of finitude is actually built into first-order languages [Shapiro] |
10588 | First-order logic is Complete, and Compact, with the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems [Shapiro] |
15944 | Second-order logic is better than set theory, since it only adds relations and operations, and nothing else [Shapiro, by Lavine] |
13629 | Broad standard semantics, or Henkin semantics with a subclass, or many-sorted first-order semantics? [Shapiro] |
13650 | Henkin semantics has separate variables ranging over the relations and over the functions [Shapiro] |
10298 | Some say that second-order logic is mathematics, not logic [Shapiro] |
13645 | In standard semantics for second-order logic, a single domain fixes the ranges for the variables [Shapiro] |
13649 | Completeness, Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem fail in second-order standard semantics [Shapiro] |
10299 | If the aim of logic is to codify inferences, second-order logic is useless [Shapiro] |
10300 | Logical consequence can be defined in terms of the logical terminology [Shapiro] |
10259 | The two standard explanations of consequence are semantic (in models) and deductive [Shapiro] |
13626 | Semantic consequence is ineffective in second-order logic [Shapiro] |
13637 | If a logic is incomplete, its semantic consequence relation is not effective [Shapiro] |
10257 | Intuitionism only sanctions modus ponens if all three components are proved [Shapiro] |
10253 | Either logic determines objects, or objects determine logic, or they are separate [Shapiro] |
10054 | Arithmetic and geometry achieve some certainty without worrying about existence [Descartes] |
10251 | The law of excluded middle might be seen as a principle of omniscience [Shapiro] |
8729 | Intuitionists deny excluded middle, because it is committed to transcendent truth or objects [Shapiro] |
13632 | Finding the logical form of a sentence is difficult, and there are no criteria of correctness [Shapiro] |
10212 | Classical connectives differ from their ordinary language counterparts; '∧' is timeless, unlike 'and' [Shapiro] |
10209 | A function is just an arbitrary correspondence between collections [Shapiro] |
13674 | We might reduce ontology by using truth of sentences and terms, instead of using objects satisfying models [Shapiro] |
10290 | Second-order variables also range over properties, sets, relations or functions [Shapiro] |
10268 | Maybe plural quantifiers should be understood in terms of classes or sets [Shapiro] |
14235 | Saying 'they can become a set' is a tautology, because reference to 'they' implies a collection [Cargile] |
10235 | A sentence is 'satisfiable' if it has a model [Shapiro] |
13633 | 'Satisfaction' is a function from models, assignments, and formulas to {true,false} [Shapiro] |
13644 | Semantics for models uses set-theory [Shapiro] |
10240 | Model theory deals with relations, reference and extensions [Shapiro] |
10239 | The central notion of model theory is the relation of 'satisfaction' [Shapiro] |
13636 | An axiomatization is 'categorical' if its models are isomorphic, so there is really only one interpretation [Shapiro] |
10214 | Theory ontology is never complete, but is only determined 'up to isomorphism' [Shapiro] |
10238 | The set-theoretical hierarchy contains as many isomorphism types as possible [Shapiro] |
13670 | Categoricity can't be reached in a first-order language [Shapiro] |
10234 | Any theory with an infinite model has a model of every infinite cardinality [Shapiro] |
13648 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show an explosion of infinite models, so 1st-order is useless for infinity [Shapiro] |
13675 | Substitutional semantics only has countably many terms, so Upward Löwenheim-Skolem trivially fails [Shapiro] |
10292 | Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: if there's an infinite model, there is a countable model [Shapiro] |
10590 | Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if natural numbers satisfy wffs, then an infinite domain satisfies them [Shapiro] |
10296 | The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems fail for second-order languages with standard semantics [Shapiro] |
13658 | Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: each satisfiable countable set always has countable models [Shapiro] |
13659 | Upward Löwenheim-Skolem: each infinite model has infinite models of all sizes [Shapiro] |
10297 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem seems to be a defect of first-order logic [Shapiro] |
13635 | 'Weakly sound' if every theorem is a logical truth; 'sound' if every deduction is a semantic consequence [Shapiro] |
13628 | We can live well without completeness in logic [Shapiro] |
13630 | Non-compactness is a strength of second-order logic, enabling characterisation of infinite structures [Shapiro] |
13646 | Compactness is derived from soundness and completeness [Shapiro] |
13661 | A language is 'semantically effective' if its logical truths are recursively enumerable [Shapiro] |
2252 | Surely maths is true even if I am dreaming? [Descartes] |
2430 | I can learn the concepts of duration and number just from observing my own thoughts [Descartes] |
10201 | Virtually all of mathematics can be modeled in set theory [Shapiro] |
13641 | Complex numbers can be defined as reals, which are defined as rationals, then integers, then naturals [Shapiro] |
8763 | The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro] |
13676 | Only higher-order languages can specify that 0,1,2,... are all the natural numbers that there are [Shapiro] |
13677 | Natural numbers are the finite ordinals, and integers are equivalence classes of pairs of finite ordinals [Shapiro] |
13445 | Descartes showed a one-one order-preserving match between points on a line and the real numbers [Descartes, by Hart,WD] |
10213 | Real numbers are thought of as either Cauchy sequences or Dedekind cuts [Shapiro] |
18243 | Understanding the real-number structure is knowing usage of the axiomatic language of analysis [Shapiro] |
18249 | Cauchy gave a formal definition of a converging sequence. [Shapiro] |
18245 | Cuts are made by the smallest upper or largest lower number, some of them not rational [Shapiro] |
24035 | Unity is something shared by many things, so in that respect they are equals [Descartes] |
24036 | I can only see the proportion of two to three if there is a common measure - their unity [Descartes] |
13652 | The 'continuum' is the cardinality of the powerset of a denumerably infinite set [Shapiro] |
10236 | There is no grounding for mathematics that is more secure than mathematics [Shapiro] |
8764 | Categories are the best foundation for mathematics [Shapiro] |
10256 | For intuitionists, proof is inherently informal [Shapiro] |
13657 | First-order arithmetic can't even represent basic number theory [Shapiro] |
10202 | Natural numbers just need an initial object, successors, and an induction principle [Shapiro] |
10294 | Second-order logic has the expressive power for mathematics, but an unworkable model theory [Shapiro] |
10205 | Mathematics originally concerned the continuous (geometry) and the discrete (arithmetic) [Shapiro] |
8762 | Two definitions of 3 in terms of sets disagree over whether 1 is a member of 3 [Shapiro] |
13656 | Some sets of natural numbers are definable in set-theory but not in arithmetic [Shapiro] |
10222 | Mathematical foundations may not be sets; categories are a popular rival [Shapiro] |
10218 | Baseball positions and chess pieces depend entirely on context [Shapiro] |
10224 | The even numbers have the natural-number structure, with 6 playing the role of 3 [Shapiro] |
10228 | Could infinite structures be apprehended by pattern recognition? [Shapiro] |
10230 | The 4-pattern is the structure common to all collections of four objects [Shapiro] |
10249 | The main mathematical structures are algebraic, ordered, and topological [Shapiro] |
10273 | Some structures are exemplified by both abstract and concrete [Shapiro] |
10276 | Mathematical structures are defined by axioms, or in set theory [Shapiro] |
8760 | Numbers do not exist independently; the essence of a number is its relations to other numbers [Shapiro] |
8761 | A 'system' is related objects; a 'pattern' or 'structure' abstracts the pure relations from them [Shapiro] |
10270 | The main versions of structuralism are all definitionally equivalent [Shapiro] |
10221 | Is there is no more to structures than the systems that exemplify them? [Shapiro] |
10248 | Number statements are generalizations about number sequences, and are bound variables [Shapiro] |
10220 | Because one structure exemplifies several systems, a structure is a one-over-many [Shapiro] |
10223 | There is no 'structure of all structures', just as there is no set of all sets [Shapiro] |
8703 | Shapiro's structuralism says model theory (comparing structures) is the essence of mathematics [Shapiro, by Friend] |
10274 | Does someone using small numbers really need to know the infinite structure of arithmetic? [Shapiro] |
10200 | We distinguish realism 'in ontology' (for objects), and 'in truth-value' (for being either true or false) [Shapiro] |
10210 | If mathematical objects are accepted, then a number of standard principles will follow [Shapiro] |
10215 | Platonists claim we can state the essence of a number without reference to the others [Shapiro] |
10233 | Platonism must accept that the Peano Axioms could all be false [Shapiro] |
10244 | Intuition is an outright hindrance to five-dimensional geometry [Shapiro] |
10280 | A stone is a position in some pattern, and can be viewed as an object, or as a location [Shapiro] |
21963 | It is possible that an omnipotent God might make one and two fail to equal three [Descartes] |
13664 | Logicism is distinctive in seeking a universal language, and denying that logic is a series of abstractions [Shapiro] |
13625 | Mathematics and logic have no border, and logic must involve mathematics and its ontology [Shapiro] |
8744 | Logicism seems to be a non-starter if (as is widely held) logic has no ontology of its own [Shapiro] |
8749 | Term Formalism says mathematics is just about symbols - but real numbers have no names [Shapiro] |
8750 | Game Formalism is just a matter of rules, like chess - but then why is it useful in science? [Shapiro] |
8752 | Deductivism says mathematics is logical consequences of uninterpreted axioms [Shapiro] |
10254 | Can the ideal constructor also destroy objects? [Shapiro] |
10255 | Presumably nothing can block a possible dynamic operation? [Shapiro] |
8753 | Critics resent the way intuitionism cripples mathematics, but it allows new important distinctions [Shapiro] |
8731 | Conceptualist are just realists or idealist or nominalists, depending on their view of concepts [Shapiro] |
13663 | Some reject formal properties if they are not defined, or defined impredicatively [Shapiro] |
8730 | 'Impredicative' definitions refer to the thing being described [Shapiro] |
10279 | Can we discover whether a deck is fifty-two cards, or a person is time-slices or molecules? [Shapiro] |
24029 | Among the simples are the graspable negations, such as rest and instants [Descartes] |
3644 | Two things being joined together doesn't prove they are the same [Descartes] |
10227 | The abstract/concrete boundary now seems blurred, and would need a defence [Shapiro] |
10226 | Mathematicians regard arithmetic as concrete, and group theory as abstract [Shapiro] |
10262 | Fictionalism eschews the abstract, but it still needs the possible (without model theory) [Shapiro] |
10277 | Structuralism blurs the distinction between mathematical and ordinary objects [Shapiro] |
13638 | Properties are often seen as intensional; equiangular and equilateral are different, despite identity of objects [Shapiro] |
10591 | Logicians use 'property' and 'set' interchangeably, with little hanging on it [Shapiro] |
16635 | Incorporeal substances are powers or forces [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
16744 | All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes] |
5016 | Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes] |
5015 | A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes] |
10272 | The notion of 'object' is at least partially structural and mathematical [Shapiro] |
2297 | If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality [Descartes] |
3626 | Knowing the attributes is enough to reveal a substance [Descartes] |
16630 | If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance [Descartes] |
5013 | A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes] |
3628 | Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes] |
16774 | Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
10275 | A blurry border is still a border [Shapiro] |
16631 | If we remove surface qualities from wax, we have an extended, flexible, changeable thing [Descartes] |
17865 | Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog] |
16633 | A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes] |
12251 | Substantial forms are not understood, and explain nothing [Descartes] |
10258 | Logical modalities may be acceptable, because they are reducible to satisfaction in models [Shapiro] |
24030 | 3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four [Descartes] |
2301 | We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone [Descartes] |
3642 | Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld on Descartes] |
10266 | Why does the 'myth' of possible worlds produce correct modal logic? [Shapiro] |
3605 | We can believe a thing without knowing we believe it [Descartes] |
20190 | Belief is not an intellectual state or act, because propositions are affirmed or denied by the will [Descartes, by Zagzebski] |
24019 | If we accept mere probabilities as true we undermine our existing knowledge [Descartes] |
9807 | In pursuing truth, anything less certain than mathematics is a waste of time [Descartes] |
1583 | In morals Descartes accepts the conventional, but rejects it in epistemology [Roochnik on Descartes] |
1585 | Descartes tried to model reason on maths instead of 'logos' [Roochnik on Descartes] |
1582 | Labelling slightly doubtful things as false is irrational [Roochnik on Descartes] |
2256 | Maybe there is only one certain fact, which is that nothing is certain [Descartes] |
3657 | Understanding, not the senses, gives certainty [Descartes] |
3658 | Total doubt can't include your existence while doubting [Descartes] |
6914 | Descartes transformed 'God is thinkable, so he exists' into 'I think, so I exist' [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
4641 | In the Meditations version of the Cogito he says "I am; I exist", which avoids presenting it as an argument [Descartes, by Baggini /Fosl] |
5005 | I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes] |
5006 | 'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes] |
24020 | We all see intuitively that we exist, where intuition is attentive, clear and distinct rational understanding [Descartes] |
24031 | When Socrates doubts, he know he doubts, and that truth is possible [Descartes] |
6929 | Modern philosophy set the self-conscious ego in place of God [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
3849 | "I think therefore I am" is the absolute truth of consciousness [Sartre on Descartes] |
2258 | I must even exist if I am being deceived by something [Descartes] |
2259 | "I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind [Descartes] |
3160 | The Cogito is a transcendental argument, not a piece of a priori knowledge [Rey on Descartes] |
3622 | The Cogito is not a syllogism but a self-evident intuition [Descartes] |
3607 | In thinking everything else false, my own existence remains totally certain [Descartes] |
2260 | If I don't think, there is no reason to think that I exist [Descartes] |
3623 | The Cogito only works if you already understand what thought and existence are [Mersenne on Descartes] |
1369 | It is a precondition of the use of the word 'I' that I exist [Ayer on Descartes] |
5360 | The thing which experiences may be momentary, and change with the next experience [Russell on Descartes] |
2870 | 'I think' assumes I exist, that thinking is known and caused, and that I am doing it [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
5188 | A thought doesn't imply other thoughts, or enough thoughts to make up a self [Ayer on Descartes] |
3624 | That I perform an activity (thinking) doesn't prove what type of thing I am [Hobbes on Descartes] |
3120 | Autistic children seem to use the 'I' concept without seeing themselves as thinkers [Segal on Descartes] |
4526 | The Cogito assumes a priori the existence of substance, when actually it is a grammatical custom [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
5579 | How can we infer that all thinking involves self-consciousness, just from my own case? [Kant on Descartes] |
5580 | My self is not an inference from 'I think', but a presupposition of it [Kant on Descartes] |
5587 | We cannot give any information a priori about the nature of the 'thing that thinks' [Kant on Descartes] |
5588 | The fact that I am a subject is not enough evidence to show that I am a substantial object [Kant on Descartes] |
13923 | Descartes' claim to know his existence before his essence is misleading or absurd [Descartes, by Lowe] |
6930 | Modern self-consciousness is a doubtful abstraction; only senses and feelings are certain [Feuerbach on Descartes] |
1117 | The Cogito proves subjective experience is basic, but makes false claims about the Self [Russell on Descartes] |
2873 | Maybe 'I' am not the thinker, but something produced by thought [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
2261 | My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false [Descartes] |
2257 | I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions [Descartes] |
24025 | Clear and distinct truths must be known all at once (unlike deductions) [Descartes] |
24022 | Our souls possess divine seeds of knowledge, which can bear spontaneous fruit [Descartes] |
3630 | Our thinking about external things doesn't disprove the existence of innate ideas [Descartes] |
2602 | What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'? [Descartes] |
2279 | A triangle has a separate non-invented nature, shown by my ability to prove facts about it [Descartes] |
5012 | 'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes] |
3617 | I aim to find the principles and causes of everything, using the seeds within my mind [Descartes] |
6490 | For Descartes, objects have one primary quality, which is geometrical [Descartes, by Robinson,H] |
22593 | Our sensation of light may not be the same as what produces the sensation [Descartes] |
7400 | Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Descartes, by Tuck] |
2295 | Why does pain make us sad? [Descartes] |
3627 | Dogs can make the same judgements as us about variable things [Gassendi on Descartes] |
2265 | We perceive objects by intellect, not by senses or imagination [Descartes] |
3611 | Understanding, rather than imagination or senses, gives knowledge [Descartes] |
8725 | Rationalism tries to apply mathematical methodology to all of knowledge [Shapiro] |
2263 | The wax is not perceived by the senses, but by the mind alone [Descartes] |
2264 | We don't 'see' men in heavy clothes, we judge them to be men [Descartes] |
24034 | If someone had only seen the basic colours, they could deduce the others from resemblance [Descartes] |
24021 | The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes] |
3606 | I was searching for reliable rock under the shifting sand [Descartes] |
2247 | To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations [Descartes] |
2255 | Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum) [Descartes] |
5004 | We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes] |
2251 | Even if my body and objects are imaginary, there may be simpler things which are true [Descartes] |
6347 | Descartes can't begin again, because sceptics doubt cognitive processes as well as beliefs [Pollock/Cruz on Descartes] |
2296 | If pain is felt in a lost limb, I cannot be certain that a felt pain exists in my real limbs [Descartes] |
3620 | We correct sense errors with other senses, not intellect [Mersenne on Descartes] |
3619 | The senses can only report, so perception errors are in the judgment [Gassendi on Descartes] |
2249 | It is prudent never to trust your senses if they have deceived you even once [Descartes] |
3621 | Only judgement decides which of our senses are reliable [Descartes] |
2253 | God may have created nothing, but made his creation appear to me as it does now [Descartes] |
2254 | To achieve full scepticism, I imagine a devil who deceives me about the external world and my own body and senses [Descartes] |
2305 | Waking actions are joined by memory to all our other actions, unlike actions of which we dream [Descartes] |
3604 | When rebuilding a house, one needs alternative lodgings [Descartes] |
2294 | I can only sense an object if it is present, and can't fail to sense it when it is [Descartes] |
3618 | Only experiments can settle disagreements between rival explanations [Descartes] |
4862 | Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza on Descartes] |
3850 | We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre on Descartes] |
2302 | Faculties of the mind aren't parts, as one mind uses them [Descartes] |
3615 | Little reason is needed to speak, so animals have no reason at all [Descartes] |
24027 | Nerves and movement originate in the brain, where imagination moves them [Descartes] |
5014 | We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation [Descartes] |
16634 | I can't be unaware of anything which is in me [Descartes] |
3151 | Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey on Descartes] |
24026 | Our four knowledge faculties are intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory [Descartes] |
21800 | Descartes mentions many cognitive faculties, but reduces them to will and intellect [Descartes, by Schmid] |
1399 | Imagination and sensation are non-essential to mind [Descartes] |
10203 | We apprehend small, finite mathematical structures by abstraction from patterns [Shapiro] |
1400 | Some cause must unite the separate temporal sections of a person [Descartes] |
3609 | I am a thinking substance, which doesn't need a place or material support [Descartes] |
1401 | Since I only observe myself to be thinking, I conclude that that is my essence [Descartes] |
2299 | I can exist without imagination and sensing, but they can't exist without me [Descartes] |
6907 | For Descartes a person's essence is the mind because objects are perceived by mind, not senses [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
5017 | In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness [Descartes] |
2283 | Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures [Descartes] |
5010 | Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea [Descartes] |
3789 | The more reasons that compel me, the freer I am [Descartes] |
2282 | My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could [Descartes] |
4310 | We have inner awareness of our freedom [Descartes] |
24028 | The force by which we know things is spiritual, and quite distinct from the body [Descartes] |
3608 | I can deny my body and the world, but not my own existence [Descartes] |
3613 | Reason is universal in its responses, but a physical machine is constrained by its organs [Descartes] |
2276 | The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks [Descartes] |
2298 | Mind is not extended, unlike the body [Descartes] |
3423 | Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Descartes, by Kim] |
2303 | The mind is utterly indivisible [Descartes] |
5011 | There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes] |
3616 | The soul must unite with the body to have appetites and sensations [Descartes] |
6153 | Interaction between mental and physical seems to violate the principle of conservation of energy [Rowlands on Descartes] |
6553 | Descartes discussed the interaction problem, and compared it with gravity [Descartes, by Lycan] |
3654 | The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [Descartes, by PG] |
3625 | The 'thinking thing' may be the physical basis of the mind [Hobbes on Descartes] |
2552 | Knowing different aspects of brain/mind doesn't make them different [Rorty on Descartes] |
4305 | Descartes gives no clear criterion for individuating mental substances [Cottingham on Descartes] |
4861 | Does Descartes have a clear conception of how mind unites with body? [Spinoza on Descartes] |
6540 | Even Descartes may concede that mental supervenes on neuroanatomical [Lycan on Descartes] |
7733 | Superman's strength is indubitable, Clark Kent's is doubtful, so they are not the same? [Maslin on Descartes] |
5018 | Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes] |
3643 | The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes] |
5686 | In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes] |
4015 | For Descartes passions are God-given preservers of the mind-body union [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
23989 | There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Descartes, by Goldie] |
4313 | Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Descartes, by Cottingham] |
4017 | Descartes created the modern view of rationality, as an internal feature instead of an external vision [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
2284 | I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding [Descartes] |
5007 | Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts [Descartes] |
3614 | A machine could speak in response to physical stimulus, but not hold a conversation [Descartes] |
5685 | True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God [Descartes] |
3629 | All ideas are adventitious, and come from the senses [Gassendi on Descartes] |
3631 | A blind man may still contain the idea of colour [Descartes] |
2600 | The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought [Descartes] |
2273 | The ideas of God and of my self are innate in me [Descartes] |
2285 | I can think of innumerable shapes I have never experienced [Descartes] |
2601 | Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them [Descartes] |
2286 | The idea of a supremely perfect being is within me, like the basic concepts of mathematics [Descartes] |
10229 | Simple types can be apprehended through their tokens, via abstraction [Shapiro] |
9626 | A structure is an abstraction, focussing on relationships, and ignoring other features [Shapiro] |
10217 | We can apprehend structures by focusing on or ignoring features of patterns [Shapiro] |
9554 | We can focus on relations between objects (like baseballers), ignoring their other features [Shapiro] |
10231 | Abstract objects might come by abstraction over an equivalence class of base entities [Shapiro] |
20037 | Merely willing to walk leads to our walking [Descartes] |
5009 | We do not praise the acts of an efficient automaton, as their acts are necessary [Descartes] |
5008 | The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes] |
16763 | We don't die because the soul departs; the soul departs because the organs cease functioning [Descartes] |
1581 | Greeks elevate virtues enormously, but never explain them [Descartes] |
4016 | Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
3635 | Essence must be known before we discuss existence [Descartes] |
19676 | Nature is devoid of thought [Descartes, by Meillassoux] |
15987 | Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes] |
2280 | Many causes are quite baffling, so it is absurd to deduce causes from final purposes [Descartes] |
12730 | We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes] |
24023 | All the sciences searching for order and measure are related to mathematics [Descartes] |
16569 | The Hot, Cold, Wet and Dry of the philosophers need themselves to be explained [Descartes] |
16684 | Impenetrability only belongs to the essence of extension [Descartes] |
6518 | Matter can't just be Descartes's geometry, because a filler of the spaces is needed [Robinson,H on Descartes] |
16601 | Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes] |
2272 | There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect [Descartes] |
16686 | God has established laws throughout nature, and implanted ideas of them within us [Descartes] |
20964 | Descartes said there was conservation of 'quantity of motion' [Descartes, by Papineau] |
2269 | God the creator is an intelligent, infinite, powerful substance [Descartes] |
2289 | Nothing apart from God could have essential existence, and such a being must be unique and eternal [Descartes] |
2275 | It is self-evident that deception is a natural defect, so God could not be a deceiver [Descartes] |
3637 | Ideas in God's mind only have value if he makes it so [Descartes] |
2287 | Existence and God's essence are inseparable, like a valley and a mountain, or a triangle and its properties [Descartes] |
2268 | One idea leads to another, but there must be an initial idea that contains the reality of all the others [Descartes] |
3640 | Possible existence is a perfection in the idea of a triangle [Descartes] |
2274 | The idea of God in my mind is like the mark a craftsman puts on his work [Descartes] |
3639 | Necessary existence is a property which is uniquely part of God's essence [Descartes] |
2288 | I cannot think of a supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection of existence [Descartes] |
3632 | We mustn't worship God as an image because we have no idea of him [Hobbes on Descartes] |
3633 | We can never conceive of an infinite being [Gassendi on Descartes] |
5036 | Descartes cannot assume that a most perfect being exists without contradictions [Leibniz on Descartes] |
3638 | Existence is not a perfection; it is what makes perfection possible [Gassendi on Descartes] |
3634 | We can't prove a first cause from our inability to grasp infinity [Descartes] |
16712 | Atheism is an atrocious and intolerable crime in any country [Descartes] |
3660 | Atheism arises from empiricism, because God is intangible [Descartes] |
16772 | An angelic mind would not experience pain, even when connected to a human body [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
3652 | I can't prove the soul is indestructible, only that it is separate from the mortal body [Descartes] |
3636 | God didn't give us good judgement even about our own lives [Gassendi on Descartes] |
2278 | Error arises because my faculty for judging truth is not infinite [Descartes] |
2277 | Since God does not wish to deceive me, my judgement won't make errors if I use it properly [Descartes] |
2281 | If we ask whether God's works are perfect, we must not take a narrow viewpoint, but look at the universe as a whole [Descartes] |