29 ideas
6222 | If a decision is in accord with right reason, everyone can agree with it [Cumberland] |
18776 | Contextual definitions eliminate descriptions from contexts [Linsky,B] |
21704 | 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B] |
21705 | Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B] |
18774 | Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B] |
21727 | Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B] |
21719 | Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B] |
21723 | The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B] |
21721 | Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B] |
21703 | Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B] |
21714 | The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B] |
21713 | Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B] |
21715 | For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B] |
21729 | Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B] |
3756 | Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3757 | Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3759 | You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3752 | Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3753 | Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3754 | Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3755 | Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3761 | Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3760 | Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3758 | Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske] |
6217 | Natural law is supplied to the human mind by reality and human nature [Cumberland] |
6221 | If there are different ultimate goods, there will be conflicting good actions, which is impossible [Cumberland] |
6218 | The happiness of individuals is linked to the happiness of everyone (which is individuals taken together) [Cumberland] |
6220 | The happiness of all contains the happiness of each, and promotes it [Cumberland] |
6216 | Natural law is immutable truth giving moral truths and duties independent of society [Cumberland] |