19 ideas
| 9254 | In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false [Prichard] |
| 6222 | If a decision is in accord with right reason, everyone can agree with it [Cumberland] |
| 19525 | If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right) [Conee/Feldman] |
| 19524 | We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs [Conee/Feldman] |
| 19518 | Evidentialism says justifications supervene on the available evidence [Conee/Feldman] |
| 19519 | Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally [Conee/Feldman] |
| 9261 | The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard] |
| 6217 | Natural law is supplied to the human mind by reality and human nature [Cumberland] |
| 6221 | If there are different ultimate goods, there will be conflicting good actions, which is impossible [Cumberland] |
| 9262 | The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard] |
| 9256 | I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard] |
| 9257 | The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard] |
| 9260 | Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard] |
| 9259 | We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard] |
| 9255 | Seeing the goodness of an effect creates the duty to produce it, not the desire [Prichard] |
| 6218 | The happiness of individuals is linked to the happiness of everyone (which is individuals taken together) [Cumberland] |
| 6220 | The happiness of all contains the happiness of each, and promotes it [Cumberland] |
| 9258 | If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard] |
| 6216 | Natural law is immutable truth giving moral truths and duties independent of society [Cumberland] |