454 ideas
7536 | If you hope to improve the world, all you can do is improve yourself [Wittgenstein] |
16010 | While faith is a passion (as Kierkegaard says), wisdom is passionless [Wittgenstein] |
18730 | The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein] |
2937 | What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence [Wittgenstein] |
2626 | A philosopher is outside any community of ideas [Wittgenstein] |
2512 | Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language [Wittgenstein] |
7085 | The main problem of philosophy is what can and cannot be thought and expressed [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
6870 | I say (contrary to Wittgenstein) that philosophy expresses what we thought we must be silent about [Ansell Pearson on Wittgenstein] |
14255 | We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K] |
18704 | Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein] |
2944 | If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it [Wittgenstein] |
9810 | The 'Tractatus' is a masterpiece of anti-philosophy [Badiou on Wittgenstein] |
23459 | This work solves all the main problems, but that has little value [Wittgenstein] |
23512 | Once you understand my book you will see that it is nonsensical [Wittgenstein] |
18710 | Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein] |
4148 | What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle [Wittgenstein] |
9208 | Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K] |
14250 | Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K] |
15053 | If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K] |
17275 | Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K] |
15054 | 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K] |
11159 | My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K] |
2938 | The limits of my language means the limits of my world [Wittgenstein] |
18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
6429 | All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions [Wittgenstein] |
23492 | Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque [Wittgenstein] |
23510 | Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language [Wittgenstein] |
18732 | We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein] |
22490 | Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use [Wittgenstein] |
9766 | Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K] |
18714 | We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein] |
23499 | This book says we should either say it clearly, or shut up [Wittgenstein] |
10571 | Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena [Fine,K] |
23508 | Science is all the true propositions [Wittgenstein] |
6222 | If a decision is in accord with right reason, everyone can agree with it [Cumberland] |
6566 | The problem is to explain the role of contradiction in social life [Wittgenstein] |
2939 | If a sign is useless it is meaningless; that is the point of Ockham's maxim [Wittgenstein] |
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
9143 | Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
10143 | 'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K] |
12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
11157 | Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K] |
14259 | Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K] |
14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
11171 | Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K] |
11178 | The essence or definition of an essence involves either a class of properties or a class of propositions [Fine,K] |
18706 | Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18735 | Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein] |
18719 | Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18731 | There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein] |
10910 | The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
15063 | Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K] |
23462 | He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
18349 | All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Wittgenstein, by Rami] |
10967 | Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read on Wittgenstein] |
7087 | Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects] [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
4702 | The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [Wittgenstein, by O'Grady] |
7056 | Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts [Wittgenstein] |
18707 | All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein] |
23483 | Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
11074 | 'It is true that this follows' means simply: this follows [Wittgenstein] |
9560 | S5 provides the correct logic for necessity in the broadly logical sense [Fine,K] |
14263 | Strong Kleene disjunction just needs one true disjunct; Weak needs the other to have some value [Fine,K] |
10565 | There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K] |
13331 | Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K] |
10564 | We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology [Fine,K] |
23502 | Logic fills the world, to its limits [Wittgenstein] |
18724 | In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein] |
16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
23504 | Logic concerns everything that is subject to law; the rest is accident [Wittgenstein] |
6428 | Wittgenstein is right that logic is just tautologies [Wittgenstein, by Russell] |
11062 | Logic is a priori because it is impossible to think illogically [Wittgenstein] |
23548 | Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K] |
17286 | Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K] |
18277 | If q implies p, that is justified by q and p, not by some 'laws' of inference [Wittgenstein] |
18162 | The propositions of logic are analytic tautologies [Wittgenstein] |
7537 | Wittgenstein convinced Russell that logic is tautologies, not Platonic forms [Wittgenstein, by Monk] |
18709 | Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein] |
9775 | Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K] |
23496 | Two colours in the same place is ruled out by the logical structure of colour [Wittgenstein] |
18736 | Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein] |
18154 | The sign of identity is not allowed in 'Tractatus' [Wittgenstein, by Bostock] |
13429 | The identity sign is not essential in logical notation, if every sign has a different meaning [Wittgenstein, by Ramsey] |
18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
18743 | Wittgenstein says we want the grammar of problems, not their first-order logical structure [Wittgenstein, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
12220 | Is it the sentence-token or the sentence-type that has a logical form? [Fine,K] |
18268 | Apparent logical form may not be real logical form [Wittgenstein] |
10905 | My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent [Wittgenstein] |
6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
11175 | Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K] |
23493 | 'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p [Wittgenstein] |
18723 | We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein] |
18718 | Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein] |
7784 | 'Object' is a pseudo-concept, properly indicated in logic by the variable x [Wittgenstein] |
15590 | It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K] |
15591 | In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K] |
15595 | The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K] |
15594 | 'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K] |
15592 | The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K] |
15593 | Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K] |
9148 | I think of variables as objects rather than as signs [Fine,K] |
14620 | Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K] |
23506 | Names are primitive, and cannot be analysed [Wittgenstein] |
18727 | A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein] |
4139 | Naming is a preparation for description [Wittgenstein] |
4946 | A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Wittgenstein, by Kripke] |
15599 | Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K] |
7089 | A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object [Wittgenstein] |
11176 | The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K] |
9467 | Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to reduce quantifiers to conjunctions and disjunctions [Wittgenstein, by Jacquette] |
12222 | Substitutional quantification is referential quantification over expressions [Fine,K] |
10569 | If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K] |
15089 | Logical proof just explicates complicated tautologies [Wittgenstein] |
10570 | Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K] |
23539 | Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K] |
13830 | Logical truths are just 'by-products' of the introduction rules for logical constants [Wittgenstein, by Hacking] |
11174 | A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K] |
9771 | Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K] |
19292 | Logic doesn't split into primitive and derived propositions; they all have the same status [Wittgenstein] |
6569 | 'This sentence is false' sends us in a looping search for its proposition [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
18281 | In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning [Wittgenstein] |
10573 | Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's [Fine,K] |
18738 | We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein] |
10575 | Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number? [Fine,K] |
10574 | Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K] |
18708 | Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein] |
18153 | A number is a repeated operation [Wittgenstein] |
18160 | The concept of number is just what all numbers have in common [Wittgenstein] |
12215 | The existence of numbers is not a matter of identities, but of constituents of the world [Fine,K] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
10560 | Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
18161 | The theory of classes is superfluous in mathematics [Wittgenstein] |
12211 | It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced' [Fine,K] |
12209 | The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers [Fine,K] |
11073 | Two and one making three has the necessity of logical inference [Wittgenstein] |
10568 | Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K] |
9224 | Proceduralism offers a version of logicism with no axioms, or objects, or ontological commitment [Fine,K] |
6849 | Wittgenstein hated logicism, and described it as a cancerous growth [Wittgenstein, by Monk] |
23509 | The logic of the world is shown by tautologies in logic, and by equations in mathematics [Wittgenstein] |
9222 | The objects and truths of mathematics are imperative procedures for their construction [Fine,K] |
9223 | My Proceduralism has one simple rule, and four complex rules [Fine,K] |
13133 | The world is facts, not things. Facts determine the world, and the world divides into facts [Wittgenstein] |
12214 | 'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin' [Fine,K] |
15078 | There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K] |
14253 | An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K] |
10145 | Abstracts cannot be identified with sets [Fine,K] |
10136 | Points in Euclidean space are abstract objects, but not introduced by abstraction [Fine,K] |
10144 | Postulationism says avoid abstract objects by giving procedures that produce truth [Fine,K] |
12212 | Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K] |
12216 | Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K] |
12218 | Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K] |
15007 | If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K] |
15006 | Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider] |
14262 | Formal grounding needs transitivity of grounding, no self-grounding, and the existence of both parties [Fine,K] |
17272 | 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K] |
17276 | If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K] |
17284 | An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K] |
17285 | 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K] |
17288 | We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K] |
15055 | Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K] |
17281 | If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K] |
17280 | Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K] |
17290 | Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K] |
14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
17274 | Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K] |
17278 | We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K] |
15050 | Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K] |
15051 | Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K] |
15052 | Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K] |
15056 | The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K] |
14261 | There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K] |
11151 | An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K] |
14251 | A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K] |
14257 | An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K] |
14254 | Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K] |
23463 | Atomic facts correspond to true elementary propositions [Wittgenstein] |
23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
7090 | The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism' [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
23464 | In atomic facts the objects hang together like chain links [Wittgenstein] |
23471 | The structure of an atomic fact is how its objects combine; this possibility is its form [Wittgenstein] |
21682 | If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it [Wittgenstein] |
22319 | Analysis must end in elementary propositions, which are combinations of names [Wittgenstein] |
21683 | Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition [Wittgenstein] |
9210 | Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K] |
10563 | A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K] |
12217 | For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K] |
15060 | Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K] |
15048 | In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K] |
15072 | Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K] |
9211 | A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K] |
15046 | Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K] |
15047 | What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K] |
23473 | Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world? [Morris,M on Wittgenstein] |
17287 | Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K] |
18737 | There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein] |
15071 | Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K] |
22312 | Facts can be both positive and negative [Wittgenstein, by Potter] |
22311 | The world is determined by the facts, and there are no further facts [Wittgenstein] |
22313 | The existence of atomic facts is a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact [Wittgenstein] |
22314 | On white paper a black spot is a positive fact and a white spot a negative fact [Wittgenstein] |
23540 | Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K] |
23546 | Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K] |
23544 | Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K] |
23542 | Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K] |
9768 | Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K] |
9776 | A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K] |
9767 | A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K] |
9770 | Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K] |
9772 | Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K] |
9773 | With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K] |
9774 | Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K] |
23541 | Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K] |
12213 | Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K] |
14217 | The 'standard' view of relations is that they hold of several objects in a given order [Fine,K] |
14216 | The 'positionalist' view of relations says the number of places is fixed, but not the order [Fine,K] |
14218 | A block on top of another contains one relation, not both 'on top of' and 'beneath' [Fine,K] |
14219 | Language imposes a direction on a road which is not really part of the road [Fine,K] |
14220 | Explain biased relations as orderings of the unbiased, or the unbiased as permutation classes of the biased? [Fine,K] |
7969 | The order of numbers is an internal relation, not an external one [Wittgenstein] |
7968 | A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it [Wittgenstein] |
16755 | The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K, by Pasnau] |
18715 | Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein] |
23466 | Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein] |
9202 | Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K] |
22320 | An 'object' is just what can be referred to without possible non-existence [Wittgenstein] |
23467 | Objects are simple [Wittgenstein] |
15075 | Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K] |
14252 | We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K] |
13332 | Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K] |
23468 | Apart from the facts, there is only substance [Wittgenstein] |
10710 | We accept substance, to avoid infinite backwards chains of meaning [Wittgenstein, by Potter] |
9769 | Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K] |
23545 | We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K] |
13333 | The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K] |
14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
13326 | A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K] |
13327 | A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K] |
13329 | An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K] |
13330 | An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K] |
13328 | Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K] |
11177 | Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object? [Fine,K] |
14256 | How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K] |
11152 | Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K] |
14258 | Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K] |
11173 | Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K] |
11179 | If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K] |
14260 | An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K] |
15106 | Essence is expressed by grammar [Wittgenstein] |
11161 | Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K] |
15065 | What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K] |
11160 | Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K] |
11158 | Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K] |
11167 | Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
16537 | Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe] |
11163 | The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K] |
11164 | It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K] |
9206 | We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K] |
10935 | An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami] |
22321 | To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Wittgenstein, by Potter] |
10936 | Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami] |
15076 | Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K] |
12295 | 3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K] |
12298 | Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K] |
12296 | 4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K] |
18882 | You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons] |
12297 | Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K] |
17279 | Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K] |
11165 | If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K] |
6056 | Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein] |
15603 | I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K] |
22322 | You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein] |
6057 | Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein] |
15073 | Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K] |
15604 | If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K] |
15074 | We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K] |
9442 | The only necessity is logical necessity [Wittgenstein] |
9205 | The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K] |
9209 | Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K] |
15064 | Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K] |
9200 | Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K] |
9212 | Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K] |
11166 | The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K] |
9216 | Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K] |
17273 | Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K] |
14530 | The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
17289 | Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K] |
18726 | For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein] |
11169 | Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K] |
11162 | Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K] |
11168 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K] |
15070 | It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K] |
23495 | The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world [Wittgenstein] |
23487 | What is thinkable is possible [Wittgenstein] |
23470 | Each thing is in a space of possible facts [Wittgenstein] |
9213 | The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K] |
15069 | Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K] |
15068 | The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K] |
23507 | Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them [Wittgenstein, by White,RM] |
23469 | An imagined world must have something in common with the real world [Wittgenstein] |
11027 | To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences [Wittgenstein] |
23465 | The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts [Wittgenstein] |
12869 | Two objects may only differ in being different [Wittgenstein] |
18712 | Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein] |
6600 | The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns [Wittgenstein] |
4153 | Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? [Wittgenstein] |
23503 | Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality [Wittgenstein] |
16907 | If the truth doesn't follow from self-evidence, then self-evidence cannot justify a truth [Wittgenstein] |
23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
23479 | The Tractatus aims to reveal the necessities, without appealing to synthetic a priori truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
23501 | There is no a priori order of things [Wittgenstein] |
7088 | Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
16909 | Logic is a priori because we cannot think illogically [Wittgenstein] |
23485 | No pictures are true a priori [Wittgenstein] |
15061 | Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K] |
18280 | We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein] |
18729 | Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein] |
6501 | As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H] |
11079 | How do I decide when to accept or obey an intuition? [Wittgenstein] |
18734 | If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein] |
3597 | Foundations need not precede other beliefs [Wittgenstein] |
3790 | Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents [Wittgenstein] |
9214 | Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K] |
6591 | Doubts can't exist if they are inexpressible or unanswerable [Wittgenstein] |
3596 | Total doubt can't even get started [Wittgenstein, by Williams,M] |
4160 | One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own beliefs [Wittgenstein] |
17665 | The 'Tractatus' is instrumentalist about laws of nature [Wittgenstein, by Armstrong] |
2941 | Induction accepts the simplest law that fits our experiences [Wittgenstein] |
18721 | Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein] |
18720 | Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein] |
17291 | We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K] |
17271 | Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K] |
17673 | The modern worldview is based on the illusion that laws explain nature [Wittgenstein] |
18716 | A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein] |
15059 | Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K] |
18713 | If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein] |
15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
19273 | I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such [Wittgenstein] |
5663 | It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's [Wittgenstein] |
19272 | To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel [Wittgenstein] |
4161 | If a lion could talk, we could not understand him [Wittgenstein] |
7392 | If a lion could talk, it would be nothing like other lions [Dennett on Wittgenstein] |
9152 | If green is abstracted from a thing, it is only seen as a type if it is common to many things [Fine,K] |
22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
2940 | The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein] |
5676 | To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein] |
23547 | It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K] |
22419 | 'I' is a subject in 'I am in pain' and an object in 'I am bleeding' [Wittgenstein, by McGinn] |
23498 | The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible [Wittgenstein] |
17277 | If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K] |
4154 | Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life? [Wittgenstein] |
18717 | Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein] |
23475 | The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable [Wittgenstein] |
4158 | An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria [Wittgenstein] |
6165 | Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict [Wittgenstein] |
4143 | One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying [Wittgenstein] |
7092 | If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it? [Grayling on Wittgenstein] |
15602 | Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K] |
15588 | You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K] |
4138 | Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? [Wittgenstein] |
7055 | Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Heil] |
12576 | Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Wittgenstein, by Peacocke] |
4157 | Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests [Wittgenstein] |
12606 | Man learns the concept of the past by remembering [Wittgenstein] |
4141 | Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross [Wittgenstein] |
7084 | What can be said is what can be thought, so language shows the limits of thought [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
9144 | Fine's 'procedural postulationism' uses creative definitions, but avoids abstract ontology [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
9149 | To obtain the number 2 by abstraction, we only want to abstract the distinctness of a pair of objects [Fine,K] |
9150 | We should define abstraction in general, with number abstraction taken as a special case [Fine,K] |
10141 | Many different kinds of mathematical objects can be regarded as forms of abstraction [Fine,K] |
10135 | We can abstract from concepts (e.g. to number) and from objects (e.g. to direction) [Fine,K] |
9142 | Fine considers abstraction as reconceptualization, to produce new senses by analysing given senses [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
10137 | Abstractionism can be regarded as an alternative to set theory [Fine,K] |
10138 | An object is the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts [Fine,K] |
10561 | Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
10562 | We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements [Fine,K] |
10567 | We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts [Fine,K] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
9146 | After abstraction all numbers seem identical, so only 0 and 1 will exist! [Fine,K] |
23450 | Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
23482 | The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations [Wittgenstein] |
23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
18283 | Language pictures the essence of the world [Wittgenstein] |
8172 | To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true [Wittgenstein] |
18725 | A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein] |
18282 | You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it [Wittgenstein] |
18728 | The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein] |
7086 | Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics [Wittgenstein] |
4150 | Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition [Wittgenstein] |
6567 | For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
6169 | We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Wittgenstein, by Rowlands] |
4155 | We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them [Wittgenstein] |
4137 | In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language [Wittgenstein] |
18705 | Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein] |
4142 | To understand a sentence means to understand a language [Wittgenstein] |
4721 | If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either [Wittgenstein] |
4149 | We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions [Wittgenstein] |
4156 | Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here" [Wittgenstein] |
4145 | How do words refer to sensations? [Wittgenstein] |
4140 | The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein] |
15596 | The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K] |
15587 | That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K] |
15589 | The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K] |
15598 | We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K] |
15600 | Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K] |
15601 | Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K] |
14618 | Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K] |
14621 | Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K] |
23511 | Propositions use old expressions for a new sense [Wittgenstein] |
23488 | Propositions are understood via their constituents [Wittgenstein] |
14622 | Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K] |
9207 | If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K] |
15605 | I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K] |
18711 | A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein] |
23486 | Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein] |
23490 | A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do [Wittgenstein] |
15058 | A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K] |
11170 | Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K] |
11172 | The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K] |
14619 | The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K] |
23497 | Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language [Wittgenstein] |
6166 | Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands on Wittgenstein] |
7875 | If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it [Wittgenstein] |
4146 | We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper) [Wittgenstein] |
4147 | If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box [Wittgenstein] |
5659 | If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Wittgenstein, by Scruton] |
4152 | Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use [Wittgenstein] |
4136 | To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life [Wittgenstein] |
23489 | We translate by means of proposition constituents, not by whole propositions [Wittgenstein] |
6318 | The doctrine of indeterminacy of translation seems implied by the later Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Quine] |
4144 | Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language [Wittgenstein] |
11049 | To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition [Wittgenstein] |
6658 | What is left over if I subtract my arm going up from my raising my arm? [Wittgenstein] |
6606 | Consider: "Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is, but ugly instead of beautiful" [Wittgenstein] |
2943 | Ethics cannot be put into words [Wittgenstein] |
6217 | Natural law is supplied to the human mind by reality and human nature [Cumberland] |
2942 | The sense of the world must lie outside the world [Wittgenstein] |
6221 | If there are different ultimate goods, there will be conflicting good actions, which is impossible [Cumberland] |
6218 | The happiness of individuals is linked to the happiness of everyone (which is individuals taken together) [Cumberland] |
6220 | The happiness of all contains the happiness of each, and promotes it [Cumberland] |
6216 | Natural law is immutable truth giving moral truths and duties independent of society [Cumberland] |
4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |
14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |
23543 | We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K] |
9215 | Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
18733 | Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein] |
15077 | It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K] |
15067 | A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K] |
15066 | B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K] |
4151 | Grammar tells what kind of object anything is - and theology is a kind of grammar [Wittgenstein] |
4159 | The human body is the best picture of the human soul [Wittgenstein] |