Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Richard Cumberland, Stewart Cohen and John L. Pollock

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26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
If a decision is in accord with right reason, everyone can agree with it [Cumberland]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock]
Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S]
We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S]
The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S]
Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S]
Contextualism says sceptical arguments are true, relative to their strict context [Cohen,S]
Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is [Cohen,S]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
There aren't invariant high standards for knowledge, because even those can be raised [Cohen,S]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Contextualists slightly concede scepticism, but only in extremely strict contexts [Cohen,S]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Natural law is supplied to the human mind by reality and human nature [Cumberland]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
If there are different ultimate goods, there will be conflicting good actions, which is impossible [Cumberland]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
The happiness of individuals is linked to the happiness of everyone (which is individuals taken together) [Cumberland]
The happiness of all contains the happiness of each, and promotes it [Cumberland]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural law is immutable truth giving moral truths and duties independent of society [Cumberland]