Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Richard Foley, Ludwig Feuerbach and Dorothy Edgington

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74 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is distinguished from other sciences by its complete lack of presuppositions [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Only that which can be an object of religion is an object of philosophy [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Philosophy should not focus on names, but on the determined nature of things [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Modern philosophy begins with Descartes' abstraction from sensation and matter [Feuerbach]
Empiricism is right about ideas, but forgets man himself as one of our objects [Feuerbach]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
The laws of reality are also the laws of thought [Feuerbach]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach]
A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if' [Edgington]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Absolute thought remains in another world from being [Feuerbach]
Being is what is undetermined, and hence indistinguishable [Feuerbach]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Being posits essence, and my essence is my being [Feuerbach]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
Particularity belongs to being, whereas generality belongs to thought [Feuerbach]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
The only true being is of the senses, perception, feeling and love [Feuerbach]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington]
Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [Edgington, by McFetridge]
An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington]
A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% [Edgington]
Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind [Edgington]
Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives [Edgington]
There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics [Edgington]
Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism [Edgington]
The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true [Edgington]
Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington]
X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington]
Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington]
I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington]
On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington]
Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Consciousness is absolute reality, and everything exists through consciousness [Feuerbach]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
Ideas arise through communication, and reason is reached through community [Feuerbach]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
In man the lowest senses of smell and taste elevate themselves to intellectual acts [Feuerbach]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Rational internal belief is conviction that a proposition enhances a belief system [Foley, by Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley]
Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
When absorbed in deep reflection, is your reason in control, or is it you? [Feuerbach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
The new philosophy thinks of the concrete in a concrete (not a abstract) manner [Feuerbach]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Plotinus was ashamed to have a body [Feuerbach]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
If you love nothing, it doesn't matter whether something exists or not [Feuerbach]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Reason, love and will are the highest perfections and essence of man - the purpose of his life [Feuerbach]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
Egoism is the only evil, love the only good; genuine love produces all the other virtues [Feuerbach]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is not a particular being, like animals, but a universal being [Feuerbach]
The essence of man is in community, but with distinct individuals [Feuerbach]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
Consciousness is said to distinguish man from animals - consciousness of his own species [Feuerbach]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
A God needs justice, kindness and wisdom, but those concepts don't depend on the concept of God [Feuerbach]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
God's existence cannot be separated from essence and concept, which can only be thought as existing [Feuerbach]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
The nature of God is an expression of human nature [Feuerbach]
If God is only an object for man, then only the essence of man is revealed in God [Feuerbach]
God is what man would like to be [Feuerbach]
God is for us a mere empty idea, which we fill with our own ego and essence [Feuerbach]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
If love, goodness and personality are human, the God who is their source is anthropomorphic [Feuerbach]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Catholicism concerns God in himself, Protestantism what God is for man [Feuerbach]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion is the consciousness of the infinite [Feuerbach]
Absolute idealism is the realized divine mind of Leibnizian theism [Feuerbach]
Today's atheism will tomorrow become a religion [Feuerbach]