47 ideas
12772 | Philosophy is a value- and attitude-driven enterprise [Fraassen] |
12771 | Is it likely that a successful, coherent, explanatory ontological hypothesis is true? [Fraassen] |
12773 | Analytic philosophy has an exceptional arsenal of critical tools [Fraassen] |
15575 | Knowledge is not a static set of correct propositions, but a continuing search for better interpretations [Polt] |
12770 | We may end up with a huge theory of carefully constructed falsehoods [Fraassen] |
3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
14919 | Empiricists deny what is unobservable, and reject objective modality [Fraassen] |
15568 | When we consider possibilities, there must be something we are considering [Polt] |
3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
6783 | To 'accept' a theory is not to believe it, but to believe it empirically adequate [Fraassen, by Bird] |
3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
8851 | Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M] |
3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
8849 | Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M] |
3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
8853 | Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M] |
3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
8855 | Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M] |
3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
8852 | In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M] |
3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
14917 | To accept a scientific theory, we only need to believe that it is empirically adequate [Fraassen] |
6784 | Why should the true explanation be one of the few we have actually thought of? [Fraassen, by Bird] |
12769 | Inference to best explanation contains all sorts of hidden values [Fraassen] |
13066 | An explanation is just descriptive information answering a particular question [Fraassen, by Salmon] |
12768 | We accept many scientific theories without endorsing them as true [Fraassen] |
3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |