Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Richard Price, John Duns Scotus and Robert Kirk

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40 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
22121 The concept of being has only one meaning, whether talking of universals or of God [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
22122 Being (not sensation or God) is the primary object of the intellect [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
16660 Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Duns Scotus, by Pasnau]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
4986 A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
16648 Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
22125 Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
15386 If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
15387 If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
16632 We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
22127 Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
13094 The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
16650 'Unity' is a particularly difficult word, because things can have hidden unity [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
16770 It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
16776 Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus]
16626 Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being' [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
16614 Matter and form give true unity; subject and accident is just unity 'per accidens' [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
10919 What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
22126 Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
16768 Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
22129 Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
22130 Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
22128 Augustine's 'illumination' theory of knowledge leads to nothing but scepticism [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
5001 Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
4993 If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
5000 Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
22131 The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
4982 Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
4991 Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R]
4994 Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
4992 In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
4990 The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
4984 All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
4998 Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
4985 If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
4997 It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
4999 For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
4995 Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
7258 The forefather of modern intuitionism is Richard Price [Price,R, by Dancy,J]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
22123 The concept of God is the unique first efficient cause, final cause, and most eminent being [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
22124 We can't infer the infinity of God from creation ex nihilo [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]