38 ideas
| 23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
| 23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
| 4020 | The modern self has disengaged reason, self-exploration, and personal commitment [Taylor,C] |
| 4002 | My aim is to map the connections between our sense of self and our moral understanding [Taylor,C] |
| 4006 | I can only be aware of myself as a person who changes by means of my personal history [Taylor,C] |
| 23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
| 23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
| 23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
| 23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
| 23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
| 23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
| 23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
| 23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
| 23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
| 23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
| 23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
| 23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
| 4003 | Selfhood and moral values are inextricably intertwined [Taylor,C] |
| 23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
| 23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
| 23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
| 23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
| 7258 | The forefather of modern intuitionism is Richard Price [Price,R, by Dancy,J] |
| 23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
| 23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |
| 4021 | Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour [Taylor,C] |
| 4005 | To have respect for people, you must feel their claims, or their injustices, or hold them in awe [Taylor,C] |
| 4004 | Consistency presupposes intrinsic description [Taylor,C] |
| 4010 | In later utilitarianism the modern stress on freedom leads to the rejection of paternalism [Taylor,C] |
| 22809 | The social contract sees society as constituted by and for individuals [Taylor,C] |
| 22811 | Assigning a right based on a human capacity implies that the capacity should be developed [Taylor,C] |
| 22815 | If freedom depends on society and culture, the greatest freedom is in shaping them [Taylor,C] |
| 22814 | Our reliance on other people close to us does not imply any political obligations [Taylor,C] |
| 22810 | A right is not just a rule, but also asserts certain ideas of moral worth [Taylor,C] |
| 22812 | For most people the primacy of rights mainly concerns freedom [Taylor,C] |
| 22813 | Property is not essential for life, but it may be essential for independence [Taylor,C] |
| 23417 | If the state is neutral, there won't be sufficient community to support a welfare state [Taylor,C, by Kymlicka] |
| 4009 | Nominalists defended the sovereignty of God against the idea of natural existing good and evil [Taylor,C] |