Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Richard Price, Nelson Goodman and Peter Goldie

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65 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
The personal view can still be objective, so I call sciences 'impersonal', rather than objective [Goldie]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
Classes are a host of ethereal, platonic, pseudo entities [Goodman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Two objects can apparently make up quite distinct arrangements in sets [Goodman, by Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
The counties of Utah, and the state, and its acres, are in no way different [Goodman]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
If all and only red things were round things, we would need to specify the 'respect' of the resemblance [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
Without respects of resemblance, we would collect blue book, blue pen, red pen, red clock together [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
If we apply the same word to different things, it is only because we are willing to do so [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals are true if logical or natural laws imply the consequence [Goodman, by McFetridge]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We know other's emotions by explanation, contagion, empathy, imagination, or sympathy [Goldie]
Empathy and imagining don't ensure sympathy, and sympathy doesn't need them [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Unlike moods, emotions have specific objects, though the difference is a matter of degree [Goldie]
Emotional intentionality as belief and desire misses out the necessity of feelings [Goldie]
A long lasting and evolving emotion is still seen as a single emotion, such as love [Goldie]
'Having an emotion' differs from 'being emotional' [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Some Aborigines have fifteen different words for types of fear [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Emotional responses can reveal to us our values, which might otherwise remain hidden [Goldie]
If we have a 'feeling towards' an object, that gives the recognition a different content [Goldie]
When actions are performed 'out of' emotion, they appear to be quite different [Goldie]
It is best to see emotions holistically, as embedded in a person's life narrative [Goldie]
If emotions are 'towards' things, they can't be bodily feelings, which lack aboutness [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
If reasons are seen impersonally (as just causal), then feelings are an irrelevant extra [Goldie]
We have feelings of which we are hardly aware towards things in the world [Goldie]
An emotion needs episodes of feeling, but not continuously [Goldie]
Moods can focus as emotions, and emotions can blur into moods [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
Emotions are not avocado pears, with a rigid core and changeable surface [Goldie]
Early Chinese basic emotions: joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking [Goldie]
Cross-cultural studies of facial expressions suggests seven basic emotions [Goldie]
A basic emotion is the foundation of a hierarchy, such as anger for types of annoyance [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
Some emotions are direct responses, and neither rational nor irrational [Goldie]
Emotional thought is not rational, but it can be intelligible [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Learning an evaluative property like 'dangerous' is also learning an emotion [Goldie]
We call emotions 'passions' because they are not as controlled as we would like [Goldie]
Emotional control is hard, but we are responsible for our emotions over long time periods [Goldie]
Emotions are not easily changed, as new knowledge makes little difference, and akrasia is possible [Goldie]
Emotional control is less concerned with emotional incidents, and more with emotional tendencies [Goldie]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate [Goldie]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Justifying reasons say you were right; excusing reasons say your act was explicable [Goldie]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
Art is a referential activity, hence indefinable, but it has a set of symptoms [Goodman]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 5. Art as Language
Artistic symbols are judged by the fruitfulness of their classifications [Goodman, by Giovannelli]
Art is like understanding a natural language, and needs a grasp of a symbol system [Goodman, by Gardner]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 7. Ontology of Art
A performance is only an instance of a work if there is not a single error [Goodman]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 2. Copies of Art
A copy only becomes an 'instance' of an artwork if there is a system of notation [Goodman]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
The forefather of modern intuitionism is Richard Price [Price,R, by Dancy,J]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Character traits are both possession of and lack of dispositions [Goldie]
We over-estimate the role of character traits when explaining behaviour [Goldie]
Psychologists suggest we are muddled about traits, and maybe they should be abandoned [Goldie]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Our capabilities did not all evolve during the hunter gathering period [Goldie]