28 ideas
| 19090 | If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words [Rorty] |
| 2557 | Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty] |
| 2556 | Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty] |
| 4726 | Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady] |
| 2549 | For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty] |
| 3340 | Von Neumann defines each number as the set of all smaller numbers [Neumann, by Blackburn] |
| 15943 | Limitation of Size is not self-evident, and seems too strong [Lavine on Neumann] |
| 3355 | Von Neumann wanted mathematical functions to replace sets [Neumann, by Benardete,JA] |
| 13489 | Von Neumann treated cardinals as a special sort of ordinal [Neumann, by Hart,WD] |
| 22716 | Von Neumann defined ordinals as the set of all smaller ordinals [Neumann, by Poundstone] |
| 12336 | A von Neumann ordinal is a transitive set with transitive elements [Neumann, by Badiou] |
| 18179 | For Von Neumann the successor of n is n U {n} (rather than {n}) [Neumann, by Maddy] |
| 18180 | Von Neumann numbers are preferred, because they continue into the transfinite [Maddy on Neumann] |
| 15925 | Each Von Neumann ordinal number is the set of its predecessors [Neumann, by Lavine] |
| 13672 | All the axioms for mathematics presuppose set theory [Neumann] |
| 16705 | Whiteness isn't created in an alteration, because it is just this-being-white [Oresme] |
| 16695 | Successive entities are in flux, flowing in existence, with different parts at different times [Oresme] |
| 2548 | If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty] |
| 6599 | Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty] |
| 2566 | You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty] |
| 2553 | The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty] |
| 2550 | Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty] |
| 2554 | Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty] |
| 2565 | Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty] |
| 2560 | Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty] |
| 2562 | A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty] |
| 2559 | Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty] |
| 2558 | Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty] |