83 ideas
| 10633 | 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo] |
| 19023 | Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies [Vetter] |
| 19033 | Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates [Vetter] |
| 19032 | S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds [Vetter] |
| 19036 | The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible [Vetter] |
| 10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
| 23445 | Naïve set theory says any formula defines a set, and coextensive sets are identical [Linnebo] |
| 10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
| 10638 | A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo] |
| 10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
| 10635 | Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo] |
| 10641 | Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo] |
| 10640 | Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo] |
| 10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
| 10636 | Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo] |
| 10639 | Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo] |
| 23447 | In classical semantics singular terms refer, and quantifiers range over domains [Linnebo] |
| 23443 | The axioms of group theory are not assertions, but a definition of a structure [Linnebo] |
| 23444 | To investigate axiomatic theories, mathematics needs its own foundational axioms [Linnebo] |
| 23446 | You can't prove consistency using a weaker theory, but you can use a consistent theory [Linnebo] |
| 23448 | Mathematics is the study of all possible patterns, and is thus bound to describe the world [Linnebo] |
| 14085 | 'Deductivist' structuralism is just theories, with no commitment to objects, or modality [Linnebo] |
| 14084 | Non-eliminative structuralism treats mathematical objects as positions in real abstract structures [Linnebo] |
| 14086 | 'Modal' structuralism studies all possible concrete models for various mathematical theories [Linnebo] |
| 14087 | 'Set-theoretic' structuralism treats mathematics as various structures realised among the sets [Linnebo] |
| 14089 | Structuralism differs from traditional Platonism, because the objects depend ontologically on their structure [Linnebo] |
| 14083 | Structuralism is right about algebra, but wrong about sets [Linnebo] |
| 14090 | In mathematical structuralism the small depends on the large, which is the opposite of physical structures [Linnebo] |
| 23441 | Logical truth is true in all models, so mathematical objects can't be purely logical [Linnebo] |
| 23442 | Game Formalism has no semantics, and Term Formalism reduces the semantics [Linnebo] |
| 19034 | The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts [Vetter] |
| 19015 | Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational') [Vetter] |
| 14091 | There may be a one-way direction of dependence among sets, and among natural numbers [Linnebo] |
| 19012 | The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality [Vetter] |
| 10643 | We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo] |
| 10637 | Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo] |
| 19024 | A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class [Vetter] |
| 14088 | An 'intrinsic' property is either found in every duplicate, or exists independent of all externals [Linnebo] |
| 17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
| 19021 | I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability [Vetter] |
| 19016 | We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....' [Vetter] |
| 19017 | Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised [Vetter] |
| 19014 | How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms? [Vetter] |
| 10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
| 17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
| 17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
| 19030 | Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important? [Vetter] |
| 19040 | We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality [Vetter] |
| 19008 | The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification [Vetter] |
| 19029 | It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p [Vetter] |
| 17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
| 17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
| 17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
| 19028 | Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location [Vetter] |
| 19010 | All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects [Vetter] |
| 19013 | Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer [Vetter] |
| 19019 | Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties [Vetter] |
| 19022 | Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing) [Vetter] |
| 23705 | A potentiality may not be a disposition, but dispositions are strong potentialities [Vetter, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 19009 | Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it [Vetter] |
| 19027 | Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials [Vetter] |
| 19025 | Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions' [Vetter] |
| 19031 | There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'. [Vetter] |
| 17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
| 17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
| 19011 | If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible? [Vetter] |
| 19037 | Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce? [Vetter] |
| 19018 | Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances [Vetter] |
| 19020 | Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics [Vetter] |
| 10634 | Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo] |
| 5078 | Kant and Mill both try to explain right and wrong, without a divine lawgiver [Taylor,R] |
| 5067 | Morality based on 'forbid', 'permit' and 'require' implies someone who does these things [Taylor,R] |
| 5079 | Pleasure can have a location, and be momentary, and come and go - but happiness can't [Taylor,R] |
| 5068 | 'Eudaimonia' means 'having a good demon', implying supreme good fortune [Taylor,R] |
| 5076 | To Greeks it seemed obvious that the virtue of anything is the perfection of its function [Taylor,R] |
| 5077 | The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R] |
| 5066 | If we are made in God's image, pursuit of excellence is replaced by duty to obey God [Taylor,R] |
| 5065 | The ethics of duty requires a religious framework [Taylor,R] |
| 19039 | The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism [Vetter] |
| 19038 | Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ [Vetter] |
| 17993 | Laws are relations of kinds, quantities and qualities, supervening on the essences of a domain [Vetter] |
| 19026 | If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different? [Vetter] |
| 19041 | Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions [Vetter] |