Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Richard Wollheim, J.G. Hamann and Kent Bach

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42 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
An object can be described without being referred to [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
Classes rarely share properties with their members - unlike universals and types [Wollheim]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Belief is no more rational than is tasting and smelling [Hamann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
How could 'S knows he has hands' not have a fixed content? [Bach]
If contextualism is right, knowledge sentences are baffling out of their context [Bach]
Sceptics aren't changing the meaning of 'know', but claiming knowing is tougher than we think [Bach]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
We often treat a type as if it were a sort of token [Wollheim]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach]
We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach]
You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach]
If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach]
We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach]
It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach]
Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach]
Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach]
'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach]
What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach]
Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Interpretation is performance for some arts, and critical for all arts [Wollheim]
A love of nature must precede a love of art [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
A criterion of identity for works of art would be easier than a definition [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 2. Art as Form
If beauty needs organisation, then totally simple things can't be beautiful [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Some say art must have verbalisable expression, and others say the opposite! [Wollheim]
It is claimed that the expressive properties of artworks are non-physical [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 6. Art as Institution
Style can't be seen directly within a work, but appreciation needs a grasp of style [Wollheim]
The traditional view is that knowledge of its genre to essential to appreciating literature [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 7. Ontology of Art
If artworks are not physical objects, they are either ideal entities, or collections of phenomena [Wollheim]
The ideal theory says art is an intuition, shaped by a particular process, and presented in public [Wollheim]
The ideal theory of art neglects both the audience and the medium employed [Wollheim]
A musical performance has virtually the same features as the piece of music [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
An interpretation adds further properties to the generic piece of music [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 3. Artistic Representation
A drawing only represents Napoleon if the artist intended it to [Wollheim]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is not a mathematician, but a poet [Hamann, by Berlin]