Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Richard Wollheim, Nathan Salmon and Edouard Machery

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102 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy is empty if it does not in some way depend on matters of fact [Machery]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / b. Terminology of ML
A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N]
In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N]
System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson]
S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N]
S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N]
The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals? [Machery]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different? [Machery]
For each category of objects (such as 'dog') an individual seems to have several concepts [Machery]
A thing is classified if its features are likely to be generated by that category's causal laws [Machery]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip [Machery]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
Classes rarely share properties with their members - unlike universals and types [Wollheim]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
There may be several ways to individuate things like concepts [Machery]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N]
Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N]
Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N]
Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N]
Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N]
Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N]
Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N]
Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification [Machery]
Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories [Machery]
Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind [Machery]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another [Machery]
'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them [Machery]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
We often treat a type as if it were a sort of token [Wollheim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes [Machery]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order' [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery]
Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery]
We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy
In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts [Machery]
In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / c. Concepts in psychology
By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure [Machery]
Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location [Machery]
Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements [Machery]
Psychologist treat concepts as categories [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery]
One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery]
Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery]
Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker [Machery]
Many categories don't seem to have a definition [Machery]
Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction [Machery]
The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation [Machery]
Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype [Machery]
Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype [Machery]
Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties [Machery]
It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars [Machery]
The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular [Machery]
Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them [Machery]
In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership [Machery]
Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains [Machery]
Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities [Machery]
If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have [Machery]
The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names [Machery]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N]
Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are [Machery]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Interpretation is performance for some arts, and critical for all arts [Wollheim]
A love of nature must precede a love of art [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
A criterion of identity for works of art would be easier than a definition [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 2. Art as Form
If beauty needs organisation, then totally simple things can't be beautiful [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Some say art must have verbalisable expression, and others say the opposite! [Wollheim]
It is claimed that the expressive properties of artworks are non-physical [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 6. Art as Institution
Style can't be seen directly within a work, but appreciation needs a grasp of style [Wollheim]
The traditional view is that knowledge of its genre to essential to appreciating literature [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 7. Ontology of Art
If artworks are not physical objects, they are either ideal entities, or collections of phenomena [Wollheim]
The ideal theory says art is an intuition, shaped by a particular process, and presented in public [Wollheim]
The ideal theory of art neglects both the audience and the medium employed [Wollheim]
A musical performance has virtually the same features as the piece of music [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
An interpretation adds further properties to the generic piece of music [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 3. Artistic Representation
A drawing only represents Napoleon if the artist intended it to [Wollheim]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Artifacts can be natural kinds, when they are the object of historical enquiry [Machery]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N]