45 ideas
| 7822 | A neo-Stoic movement began in the late sixteenth century [Lipsius, by Grayling] |
| 11051 | Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna] |
| 11054 | Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences [Hanna] |
| 11070 | 'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ [Hanna] |
| 11071 | 'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ [Hanna] |
| 11088 | We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies [Hanna] |
| 11059 | Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna] |
| 11089 | Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology [Hanna] |
| 11058 | Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals [Hanna] |
| 11072 | Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core [Hanna] |
| 11061 | Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts [Hanna] |
| 11063 | Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity [Hanna] |
| 11055 | Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection [Hanna] |
| 20339 | Classes rarely share properties with their members - unlike universals and types [Wollheim] |
| 11083 | A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna] |
| 11086 | Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna] |
| 11084 | Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna] |
| 11085 | Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna] |
| 11078 | Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna] |
| 11077 | Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna] |
| 11080 | Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna] |
| 11053 | Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction [Hanna] |
| 11081 | Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions [Hanna] |
| 20338 | We often treat a type as if it were a sort of token [Wollheim] |
| 11082 | Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? [Hanna] |
| 11067 | Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity [Hanna] |
| 11068 | One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic [Hanna] |
| 11047 | Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence [Hanna] |
| 11048 | Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths [Hanna] |
| 11046 | Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths [Hanna] |
| 11045 | Most psychologists are now cognitivists [Hanna] |
| 20342 | Interpretation is performance for some arts, and critical for all arts [Wollheim] |
| 20343 | A love of nature must precede a love of art [Wollheim] |
| 20348 | A criterion of identity for works of art would be easier than a definition [Wollheim] |
| 20347 | If beauty needs organisation, then totally simple things can't be beautiful [Wollheim] |
| 20345 | Some say art must have verbalisable expression, and others say the opposite! [Wollheim] |
| 20331 | It is claimed that the expressive properties of artworks are non-physical [Wollheim] |
| 20336 | Style can't be seen directly within a work, but appreciation needs a grasp of style [Wollheim] |
| 20337 | The traditional view is that knowledge of its genre to essential to appreciating literature [Wollheim] |
| 20333 | If artworks are not physical objects, they are either ideal entities, or collections of phenomena [Wollheim] |
| 20334 | The ideal theory says art is an intuition, shaped by a particular process, and presented in public [Wollheim] |
| 20335 | The ideal theory of art neglects both the audience and the medium employed [Wollheim] |
| 20340 | A musical performance has virtually the same features as the piece of music [Wollheim] |
| 20341 | An interpretation adds further properties to the generic piece of music [Wollheim] |
| 20332 | A drawing only represents Napoleon if the artist intended it to [Wollheim] |