Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Richard Wollheim, Sphaerus and G.E. Moore

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40 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / b. Modern philosophy beginnings
6405 Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
17992 The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe. [Moore,GE]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
7527 Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
21342 A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Moore,GE, by Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
20339 Classes rarely share properties with their members - unlike universals and types [Wollheim]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
6672 Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false' [Moore,GE, by Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
20147 Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger [Moore,GE]
6349 I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand' [Moore,GE]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
20769 Sphaerus he was not assenting to the presence of pomegranates, but that it was 'reasonable' [Sphaerus, by Diog. Laertius]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
20338 We often treat a type as if it were a sort of token [Wollheim]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
22302 Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
7526 Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
20342 Interpretation is performance for some arts, and critical for all arts [Wollheim]
20343 A love of nature must precede a love of art [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
21233 The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
20348 A criterion of identity for works of art would be easier than a definition [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 2. Art as Form
20347 If beauty needs organisation, then totally simple things can't be beautiful [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
20345 Some say art must have verbalisable expression, and others say the opposite! [Wollheim]
20331 It is claimed that the expressive properties of artworks are non-physical [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 6. Art as Institution
20336 Style can't be seen directly within a work, but appreciation needs a grasp of style [Wollheim]
20337 The traditional view is that knowledge of its genre to essential to appreciating literature [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 7. Ontology of Art
20333 If artworks are not physical objects, they are either ideal entities, or collections of phenomena [Wollheim]
20334 The ideal theory says art is an intuition, shaped by a particular process, and presented in public [Wollheim]
20335 The ideal theory of art neglects both the audience and the medium employed [Wollheim]
20340 A musical performance has virtually the same features as the piece of music [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
20341 An interpretation adds further properties to the generic piece of music [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 3. Artistic Representation
20332 A drawing only represents Napoleon if the artist intended it to [Wollheim]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
8039 Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
22151 The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
11056 The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
8033 Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
8032 Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
11050 Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
23726 Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18676 We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
11057 It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
5925 The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
5902 For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
5903 'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
5907 Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]