Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Robert Axelrod, E.J. Lemmon and Jean-Paul Sartre

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111 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Phenomenology assumes that all consciousness is of something [Sartre]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
'Contradictory' propositions always differ in truth-value [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
That proposition that both P and Q is their 'conjunction', written P∧Q [Lemmon]
The sign |- may be read as 'therefore' [Lemmon]
If A and B are 'interderivable' from one another we may write A -||- B [Lemmon]
We write the conditional 'if P (antecedent) then Q (consequent)' as P→Q [Lemmon]
We write the 'negation' of P (not-P) as ¬ [Lemmon]
That proposition that either P or Q is their 'disjunction', written P∨Q [Lemmon]
We write 'P if and only if Q' as P↔Q; it is also P iff Q, or (P→Q)∧(Q→P) [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
A 'well-formed formula' follows the rules for variables, ¬, →, ∧, ∨, and ↔ [Lemmon]
A 'substitution-instance' is a wff formed by consistent replacing variables with wffs [Lemmon]
A wff is 'inconsistent' if all assignments to variables result in the value F [Lemmon]
Two propositions are 'equivalent' if they mirror one another's truth-value [Lemmon]
'Subcontrary' propositions are never both false, so that A∨B is a tautology [Lemmon]
'Contrary' propositions are never both true, so that ¬(A∧B) is a tautology [Lemmon]
The 'scope' of a connective is the connective, the linked formulae, and the brackets [Lemmon]
A wff is a 'tautology' if all assignments to variables result in the value T [Lemmon]
A wff is 'contingent' if produces at least one T and at least one F [Lemmon]
A 'theorem' is the conclusion of a provable sequent with zero assumptions [Lemmon]
A 'implies' B if B is true whenever A is true (so that A→B is tautologous) [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
DN: Given A, we may derive ¬¬A [Lemmon]
∧I: Given A and B, we may derive A∧B [Lemmon]
MPP: Given A and A→B, we may derive B [Lemmon]
∧E: Given A∧B, we may derive either A or B separately [Lemmon]
∨E: Derive C from A∨B, if C can be derived both from A and from B [Lemmon]
MTT: Given ¬B and A→B, we derive ¬A [Lemmon]
A: we may assume any proposition at any stage [Lemmon]
∨I: Given either A or B separately, we may derive A∨B [Lemmon]
RAA: If assuming A will prove B∧¬B, then derive ¬A [Lemmon]
CP: Given a proof of B from A as assumption, we may derive A→B [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / d. Basic theorems of PL
'Modus ponendo tollens' (MPT) says P, ¬(P ∧ Q) |- ¬Q [Lemmon]
We can change conjunctions into negated conditionals with P→Q -||- ¬(P → ¬Q) [Lemmon]
The Distributive Laws can rearrange a pair of conjunctions or disjunctions [Lemmon]
De Morgan's Laws make negated conjunctions/disjunctions into non-negated disjunctions/conjunctions [Lemmon]
We can change conditionals into disjunctions with P→Q -||- ¬P ∨ Q [Lemmon]
We can change conditionals into negated conjunctions with P→Q -||- ¬(P ∧ ¬Q) [Lemmon]
'Modus tollendo ponens' (MTP) says ¬P, P ∨ Q |- Q [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Truth-tables are good for showing invalidity [Lemmon]
A truth-table test is entirely mechanical, but this won't work for more complex logic [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 4. Soundness of PL
If any of the nine rules of propositional logic are applied to tautologies, the result is a tautology [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 5. Completeness of PL
Propositional logic is complete, since all of its tautologous sequents are derivable [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / a. Symbols of PC
Write '(∀x)(...)' to mean 'take any x: then...', and '(∃x)(...)' to mean 'there is an x such that....' [Lemmon]
'Gm' says m has property G, and 'Pmn' says m has relation P to n [Lemmon]
The 'symbols' are bracket, connective, term, variable, predicate letter, reverse-E [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / b. Terminology of PC
Our notation uses 'predicate-letters' (for 'properties'), 'variables', 'proper names', 'connectives' and 'quantifiers' [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / c. Derivations rules of PC
Universal Elimination (UE) lets us infer that an object has F, from all things having F [Lemmon]
Predicate logic uses propositional connectives and variables, plus new introduction and elimination rules [Lemmon]
Universal elimination if you start with the universal, introduction if you want to end with it [Lemmon]
With finite named objects, we can generalise with &-Intro, but otherwise we need ∀-Intro [Lemmon]
UE all-to-one; UI one-to-all; EI arbitrary-to-one; EE proof-to-one [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / d. Universal quantifier ∀
If there is a finite domain and all objects have names, complex conjunctions can replace universal quantifiers [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / e. Existential quantifier ∃
'Some Frenchmen are generous' is rendered by (∃x)(Fx→Gx), and not with the conditional → [Lemmon]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
The paradoxes of material implication are P |- Q → P, and ¬P |- P → Q [Lemmon]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
The consciousness that says 'I think' is not the consciousness that thinks [Sartre]
The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness [Sartre]
Is the Cogito reporting an immediate experience of doubting, or the whole enterprise of doubting? [Sartre]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself [Sartre]
We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
The eternal truth of 2+2=4 is what gives unity to the mind which regularly thinks it [Sartre]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Consciousness always transcends itself [Sartre]
Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Since we are a consciousness, Sartre entirely rejected the unconscious mind [Sartre, by Daigle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
Man is nothing else but the sum of his actions [Sartre]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre]
Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre]
My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre]
The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence [Sartre]
The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World [Sartre]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Man IS freedom [Sartre]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
An emotion and its object form a unity, so emotion is a mode of apprehension [Sartre]
Emotion is one of our modes of understanding our Being-in-the-World [Sartre]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Emotions are a sort of bodily incantation which brings a magic to the world [Sartre]
Emotions makes us believe in and live in a new world [Sartre]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Man is a useless passion [Sartre]
Man is the desire to be God [Sartre]
There is no human nature [Sartre]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
There are no values to justify us, and no excuses [Sartre]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
If values depend on us, freedom is the foundation of all values [Sartre]
Sartre's freedom is not for whimsical action, but taking responsibility for our own values [Sartre, by Daigle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is the demand to be loved [Sartre]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
When players don't meet again, defection is the best strategy [Axelrod]
Good strategies avoid conflict, respond to hostility, forgive, and are clear [Axelrod]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
In becoming what we want to be we create what we think man ought to be [Sartre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Cowards are responsible for their cowardice [Sartre]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
When my personal freedom becomes involved, I must want freedom for everyone else [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Existentialists says that cowards and heroes make themselves [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Fear concerns the world, but 'anguish' comes from confronting my self [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Existence before essence (or begin with the subjective) [Sartre]
'Existence precedes essence' means we have no pre-existing self, but create it through existence [Sartre, by Le Poidevin]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Existentialism says man is whatever he makes of himself [Sartre]
Authenticity is taking responsibility for a situation, with all its risks and emotions [Sartre]
Sincerity is not authenticity, because it only commits to one particular identity [Sartre, by Aho]
We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre]
It is dishonest to offer passions as an excuse [Sartre]
Sartre gradually realised that freedom is curtailed by the weight of situation [Sartre, by Daigle]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
If I do not choose, that is still a choice [Sartre]
When a man must choose between his mother and the Resistance, no theory can help [Sartre, by Fogelin]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
States have a monopoly of legitimate violence [Sartre, by Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
The truth about events always comes from the oppressed and disadvantaged [Sartre, by Bakewell]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Without God there is no intelligibility or value [Sartre]