Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Robert Axelrod, Simon Blackburn and Peter Goldie

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46 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
The personal view can still be objective, so I call sciences 'impersonal', rather than objective [Goldie]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Asserting a necessity just expresses our inability to imagine it is false [Blackburn]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
If we are told the source of necessity, this seems to be a regress if the source is not already necessary [Blackburn]
If something underlies a necessity, is that underlying thing necessary or contingent? [Blackburn, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Visual sense data are an inner picture show which represents the world [Blackburn]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion [Blackburn]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We know other's emotions by explanation, contagion, empathy, imagination, or sympathy [Goldie]
Empathy and imagining don't ensure sympathy, and sympathy doesn't need them [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
'Having an emotion' differs from 'being emotional' [Goldie]
Unlike moods, emotions have specific objects, though the difference is a matter of degree [Goldie]
Emotional intentionality as belief and desire misses out the necessity of feelings [Goldie]
A long lasting and evolving emotion is still seen as a single emotion, such as love [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Some Aborigines have fifteen different words for types of fear [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Emotional responses can reveal to us our values, which might otherwise remain hidden [Goldie]
If we have a 'feeling towards' an object, that gives the recognition a different content [Goldie]
When actions are performed 'out of' emotion, they appear to be quite different [Goldie]
It is best to see emotions holistically, as embedded in a person's life narrative [Goldie]
If emotions are 'towards' things, they can't be bodily feelings, which lack aboutness [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
If reasons are seen impersonally (as just causal), then feelings are an irrelevant extra [Goldie]
We have feelings of which we are hardly aware towards things in the world [Goldie]
An emotion needs episodes of feeling, but not continuously [Goldie]
Moods can focus as emotions, and emotions can blur into moods [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
Emotions are not avocado pears, with a rigid core and changeable surface [Goldie]
Early Chinese basic emotions: joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking [Goldie]
Cross-cultural studies of facial expressions suggests seven basic emotions [Goldie]
A basic emotion is the foundation of a hierarchy, such as anger for types of annoyance [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
Some emotions are direct responses, and neither rational nor irrational [Goldie]
Emotional thought is not rational, but it can be intelligible [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Learning an evaluative property like 'dangerous' is also learning an emotion [Goldie]
We call emotions 'passions' because they are not as controlled as we would like [Goldie]
Emotional control is hard, but we are responsible for our emotions over long time periods [Goldie]
Emotions are not easily changed, as new knowledge makes little difference, and akrasia is possible [Goldie]
Emotional control is less concerned with emotional incidents, and more with emotional tendencies [Goldie]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Akrasia is intelligible in hindsight, when we revisit our previous emotions [Blackburn]
Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate [Goldie]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Justifying reasons say you were right; excusing reasons say your act was explicable [Goldie]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Some philosophers always want more from morality; for others, nature is enough [Blackburn]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
The main objection to intuitionism in ethics is that intuition is a disguise for prejudice or emotion [Blackburn]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
When players don't meet again, defection is the best strategy [Axelrod]
Good strategies avoid conflict, respond to hostility, forgive, and are clear [Axelrod]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Character traits are both possession of and lack of dispositions [Goldie]
We over-estimate the role of character traits when explaining behaviour [Goldie]
Psychologists suggest we are muddled about traits, and maybe they should be abandoned [Goldie]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
The word 'respect' ranges from mere non-interference to the highest levels of reverence [Blackburn]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Our capabilities did not all evolve during the hunter gathering period [Goldie]