128 ideas
16440 | I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker] |
16468 | Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker] |
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
16449 | In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker] |
12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
16464 | We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker] |
16465 | In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker] |
16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
3338 | Numbers have been defined in terms of 'successors' to the concept of 'zero' [Peano, by Blackburn] |
13949 | All models of Peano axioms are isomorphic, so the models all seem equally good for natural numbers [Cartwright,R on Peano] |
18113 | PA concerns any entities which satisfy the axioms [Peano, by Bostock] |
17634 | Peano axioms not only support arithmetic, but are also fairly obvious [Peano, by Russell] |
5897 | 0 is a non-successor number, all successors are numbers, successors can't duplicate, if P(n) and P(n+1) then P(all-n) [Peano, by Flew] |
15653 | We can add Reflexion Principles to Peano Arithmetic, which assert its consistency or soundness [Halbach on Peano] |
17635 | Arithmetic can have even simpler logical premises than the Peano Axioms [Russell on Peano] |
16434 | Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker] |
16439 | A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker] |
16443 | Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker] |
16471 | I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker] |
16452 | Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker] |
14617 | Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker] |
12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
16467 | 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker] |
12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
16453 | The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker] |
16466 | Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker] |
14286 | In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker] |
10994 | Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read] |
16438 | Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker] |
16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
16436 | Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
16421 | Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker] |
16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker] |
16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
14285 | A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker] |
15793 | We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan] |
16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
16437 | Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker] |
16444 | Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker] |
16445 | I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker] |
12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
16454 | Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
16450 | Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker] |
16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker] |
16474 | How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker] |
16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
16432 | One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker] |
16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
16461 | We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker] |
16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
16448 | Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker] |
16430 | Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker] |
16431 | In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker] |
16442 | I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker] |
16447 | A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker] |
14616 | A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker] |
16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
18052 | An assertion aims to add to the content of a context [Stalnaker, by Magidor] |
14718 | An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning [Stalnaker, by Schroeter] |
19956 | True goodness is political, and consists of love of and submission to the laws [Montesquieu] |
19961 | Primitive people would be too vulnerable and timid to attack anyone, so peace would reign [Montesquieu] |
19962 | Men do not desire to subjugate one another; domination is a complex and advanced idea [Montesquieu] |
19963 | People are drawn into society by needs, shared fears, pleasure, and knowledge [Montesquieu] |
20008 | People are guided by a multitude of influences, from which the spirit of a nation emerges [Montesquieu] |
19993 | In small republics citizens identify with the public good, and abuses are fewer [Montesquieu] |
19992 | In a large republic there is too much wealth for individuals to manage it [Montesquieu] |
20005 | The rich would never submit to a lottery deciding which part of their society should be slaves [Montesquieu] |
19995 | All states aim at preservation, and then have distinctive individual purposes [Montesquieu] |
19964 | The natural power of a father suggests rule by one person, but that authority can be spread [Montesquieu] |
19986 | Monarchies can act more quickly, because one person is in charge [Montesquieu] |
19972 | The nobility are an indispensable part of a monarchy [Montesquieu] |
19974 | Monarchs must not just have links to the people; they need a body which maintains the laws [Montesquieu] |
19976 | Ambition is good in a monarchy, because the monarch can always restrain it [Montesquieu] |
19978 | In monarchies, men's actions are judged by their grand appearance, not their virtues [Montesquieu] |
19985 | In a monarchy, the nobility must be hereditary, to bind them together [Montesquieu] |
19988 | A despot's agents must be given power, so they inevitably become corrupt [Montesquieu] |
19977 | Despotism and honour are incompatible, because honour scorns his power, and lives by rules [Montesquieu] |
20007 | Tyranny is either real violence, or the imposition of unpopular legislation [Montesquieu] |
19975 | Despots are always lazy and ignorant, so they always delegate their power to a vizier [Montesquieu] |
19989 | The will of a despot is an enigma, so magistrates can only follow their own will [Montesquieu] |
19970 | If the nobility is numerous, the senate is the artistocracy, and the nobles are a democracy [Montesquieu] |
19971 | Aristocracy is democratic if they resemble the people, but not if they resemble the monarch [Montesquieu] |
19984 | Great inequality between aristocrats and the rest is bad - and also among aristocrats themselves [Montesquieu] |
19980 | If a government is to be preserved, it must first be loved [Montesquieu] |
19996 | A government has a legislature, an international executive, and a domestic executive [Montesquieu] |
19997 | The judiciary must be separate from the legislature, to avoid arbitrary power [Montesquieu] |
19965 | The fundamental laws of a democracy decide who can vote [Montesquieu] |
19968 | It is basic to a democracy that the people themselves must name their ministers [Montesquieu] |
19969 | Voting should be public, so the lower classes can be influenced by the example of notable people [Montesquieu] |
19999 | All citizens (apart from the very humble poor) should choose their representatives [Montesquieu] |
19967 | In a democracy the people should manage themselves, and only delegate what they can't do [Montesquieu] |
19966 | A democratic assembly must have a fixed number, to see whether everyone has spoken [Montesquieu] |
19998 | If deputies represent people, they are accountable, but less so if they represent places [Montesquieu] |
20003 | Slaves are not members of the society, so no law can forbid them to run away [Montesquieu] |
20000 | Slavery is entirely bad; the master abandons the virtues, and they are pointless in the slave [Montesquieu] |
20006 | The demand for slavery is just the masters' demand for luxury [Montesquieu] |
20009 | Freedom of speech and writing, within the law, is essential to preserve liberty [Montesquieu] |
19994 | Freedom in society is ability to do what is right, and not having to do what is wrong [Montesquieu] |
19981 | No one even thinks of equality in monarchies and despotism; they all want superiority [Montesquieu] |
19991 | Equality is not command by everyone or no one, but command and obedience among equals [Montesquieu] |
19990 | Democracy is corrupted by lack of equality, or by extreme equality (between rulers and ruled) [Montesquieu] |
19982 | Some equality can be achieved by social categories, combined with taxes and poor relief [Montesquieu] |
19983 | Democracies may sometimes need to restrict equality [Montesquieu] |
19959 | Prior to positive laws there is natural equity, of obedience, gratitude, dependence and merit [Montesquieu] |
19960 | Sensation gives animals natural laws, but knowledge can make them break them [Montesquieu] |
20002 | The death penalty is permissible, because its victims enjoyed the protection of that law [Montesquieu] |
20010 | If religion teaches determinism, penalties must be severe; if free will, then that is different [Montesquieu] |
20001 | The only right victors have over captives is the protection of the former [Montesquieu] |
19973 | The clergy are essential to a monarchy, but dangerous in a republic [Montesquieu] |
19987 | Religion has the most influence in despotic states, and reinforces veneration for the ruler [Montesquieu] |
20011 | Religion can support the state when the law fails to do so [Montesquieu] |
20004 | French slavery was accepted because it was the best method of religious conversion [Montesquieu] |
19979 | In monarchies education ennobles people, and in despotisms it debases them [Montesquieu] |
19957 | Teaching is the best practice of the general virtue that leads us to love everyone [Montesquieu] |
19958 | Laws are the necessary relations that derive from the nature of things [Montesquieu] |