Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Robert Kirk, Keith Devlin and Douglas Edwards

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

32 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
8092 Logic was merely a branch of rhetoric until the scientific 17th century [Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
8081 'No councillors are bankers' and 'All bankers are athletes' implies 'Some athletes are not councillors' [Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
8085 Modern propositional inference replaces Aristotle's 19 syllogisms with modus ponens [Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
8086 Predicate logic retains the axioms of propositional logic [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
8091 Situation theory is logic that takes account of context [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
8087 Golden ages: 1900-1960 for pure logic, and 1950-1985 for applied logic [Devlin]
8089 Montague's intensional logic incorporated the notion of meaning [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
8082 Where a conditional is purely formal, an implication implies a link between premise and conclusion [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
8072 Sentences of apparent identical form can have different contextual meanings [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
8075 Space and time are atomic in the arrow, and divisible in the tortoise [Devlin]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
4986 A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
18430 We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
18432 Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
18437 Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
18434 That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
8088 People still say the Hopi have no time concepts, despite Whorf's later denial [Devlin]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
5001 Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
4993 If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
5000 Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
4982 Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
4991 Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R]
4994 Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
4992 In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
4990 The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
4984 All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
4998 Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
4985 If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
4997 It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
4999 For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
4995 Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
8073 How do we parse 'time flies like an arrow' and 'fruit flies like an apple'? [Devlin]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
8076 The distinction between sentences and abstract propositions is crucial in logic [Devlin]