38 ideas
| 9327 | Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick] |
| 19090 | If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words [Rorty] |
| 2557 | Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty] |
| 2556 | Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty] |
| 4726 | Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady] |
| 2549 | For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty] |
| 9325 | In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick] |
| 9326 | Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick] |
| 2548 | If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty] |
| 6599 | Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty] |
| 2566 | You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty] |
| 6685 | 'Subjectivism' is an extension of relativism from the social group to the individual [Graham] |
| 2553 | The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty] |
| 2550 | Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty] |
| 9319 | Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick] |
| 9320 | Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick] |
| 9321 | Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick] |
| 9322 | Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick] |
| 2554 | Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty] |
| 2565 | Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty] |
| 2560 | Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty] |
| 2562 | A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty] |
| 2559 | Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty] |
| 6699 | The chain of consequences may not be the same as the chain of responsibility [Graham] |
| 6698 | Negative consequences are very hard (and possibly impossible) to assess [Graham] |
| 6700 | We can't criticise people because of unforeseeable consequences [Graham] |
| 6704 | Egoism submits to desires, but cannot help form them [Graham] |
| 6701 | Rescue operations need spontaneous benevolence, not careful thought [Graham] |
| 6693 | 'What if everybody did that?' rather misses the point as an objection to cheating [Graham] |
| 6691 | It is more plausible to say people can choose between values, than that they can create them [Graham] |
| 6688 | Life is only absurd if you expected an explanation and none turns up [Graham] |
| 6705 | Existentialism may transcend our nature, unlike eudaimonism [Graham] |
| 6690 | A standard problem for existentialism is the 'sincere Nazi' [Graham] |
| 6689 | The key to existentialism: the way you make choices is more important than what you choose [Graham] |
| 2558 | Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty] |
| 9324 | From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick] |
| 6706 | The great religions are much more concerned with the religious life than with ethics [Graham] |
| 6709 | Western religion saves us from death; Eastern religion saves us from immortality [Graham] |