Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Robin Waterfield, Bernard Williams and Johann Fichte

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114 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy attains its goal if one person feels perfect accord between their system and experience [Fichte]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
For Fichte there is no God outside the ego, and 'our religion is reason' [Fichte, by Feuerbach]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
The need to act produces consciousness, and practical reason is the root of all reason [Fichte]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Sufficient reason makes the transition from the particular to the general [Fichte]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
A mathematical object exists if there is no contradiction in its definition [Waterfield]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
In the realist view, the real external world explains how it (and perceptions of it) are possible [Williams,B]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Each object has a precise number of properties, each to a precise degree [Fichte]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
The principle of activity and generation is found in a self-moving basic force [Fichte]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
Necessity implies possibility, but in experience it matters which comes first [Williams,B]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Mental presentation are not empirical, but concern the strivings of the self [Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
The thing-in-itself is an empty dream [Fichte, by Pinkard]
Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
Fichte believed in things-in-themselves [Fichte, by Moore,AW]
We can deduce experience from self-consciousness, without the thing-in-itself [Fichte]
I am myself, but not the external object; so I only sense myself, and not the object [Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard]
The absolute I divides into consciousness, and a world which is not-I [Fichte, by Bowie]
Reason arises from freedom, so philosophy starts from the self, and not from the laws of nature [Fichte]
Abandon the thing-in-itself; things only exist in relation to our thinking [Fichte]
Self-consciousness is the basis of knowledge, and knowing something is knowing myself [Fichte]
There is nothing to say about anything which is outside my consciousness [Fichte]
Awareness of reality comes from the free activity of consciousness [Fichte]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
I immediately know myself, and anything beyond that is an inference [Fichte]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Faith is not knowledge; it is a decision of the will [Fichte]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Knowledge can't be its own foundation; there has to be regress of higher and higher authorities [Fichte]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
It is very confused to deduce a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration from relativism [Williams,B]
Our ability to react to an alien culture shows that ethical thought extends beyond cultural boundaries [Williams,B]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Consciousness has two parts, passively receiving sensation, and actively causing productions [Fichte]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
We can't know by sight or hearing without realising that we are doing so [Fichte]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B]
You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep]
Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte]
The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard]
Consciousness of external things is always accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of self [Fichte]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Williams,B, by Macdonald,C]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 6. Body sustains Self
Effective individuals must posit a specific material body for themselves [Fichte]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Forming purposes is absolutely free, and produces something from nothing [Fichte]
The capacity for freedom is above the laws of nature, with its own power of purpose and will [Fichte]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
I want independent control of the fundamental cause of my decisions [Fichte]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will [Fichte]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B]
There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Nature contains a fundamental force of thought [Fichte]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions [Williams,B]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things [Williams,B]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is awareness of one of our inner natural forces [Fichte]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise [Williams,B]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
Many ethical theories neglect the power of regretting the ought not acted upon [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts [Williams,B, by Foot]
We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order) [Williams,B, by Foot]
If moral systems can't judge other moral systems, then moral relativism is true [Williams,B, by Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B]
Blame usually has no effect if the recipient thinks it unjustified [Williams,B]
Blame partly rests on the fiction that blamed agents always know their obligations [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
I cannot change the nature which has been determined for me [Fichte]
We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific [Williams,B, by Hursthouse]
The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
The self is, apart from outward behaviour, a drive in your nature [Fichte]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
If life lacks love it becomes destruction [Fichte]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared [Williams,B]
For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one [Williams,B]
It is an error of consequentialism to think we just aim at certain states of affairs; we also want to act [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
If all that matters in morality is motive and intention, that makes moral luck irrelevant [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses [Williams,B]
It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves' [Williams,B]
Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Equality of opportunity without equality of respect would create a very inhuman society [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent [Williams,B]
Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future [Williams,B]
Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done [Williams,B]
"Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation [Williams,B]
The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B]
We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B]
If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B]
Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness [Williams,B]
If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity [Williams,B]
For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Freedom means making yourself become true to your essential nature [Fichte]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions [Williams,B]
Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Equality implies that people are alike in potential as well as in needs [Williams,B]
Equality seems to require that each person be acknowledged as having a significant point of view [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
It is a mark of extreme exploitation that the sufferers do not realise their plight [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Most women see an early miscarriage and a late stillbirth as being very different in character [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Speciesism isn't like racism, because the former implies a viewpoint which belongs to no one [Williams,B]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature is wholly interconnected, and the tiniest change affects everything [Fichte]
Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B]