87 ideas
| 11912 | Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar] |
| 15801 | Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves [Chisholm] |
| 15802 | I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout [Chisholm] |
| 11920 | A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar] |
| 15832 | Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 11919 | Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 15829 | The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted [Chisholm] |
| 15809 | A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property [Chisholm] |
| 15828 | I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm] |
| 13120 | Chisholm divides things into contingent and necessary, and then individuals, states and non-states [Chisholm, by Westerhoff] |
| 11929 | The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar] |
| 11927 | Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar] |
| 15830 | Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm] |
| 11915 | If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar] |
| 15827 | Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm] |
| 11916 | 'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar] |
| 11956 | 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar] |
| 15804 | If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine' [Chisholm] |
| 11928 | Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar] |
| 11933 | A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar] |
| 11932 | Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar] |
| 11934 | The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar] |
| 11947 | Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar] |
| 11953 | Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar] |
| 11952 | The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar] |
| 11943 | Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar] |
| 11939 | If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar] |
| 11914 | Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar] |
| 11913 | For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar] |
| 11962 | Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar] |
| 15810 | Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm] |
| 15805 | Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm] |
| 15807 | A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm] |
| 11917 | Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar] |
| 11955 | There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar] |
| 15814 | A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities [Chisholm] |
| 12852 | If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Chisholm, by Simons] |
| 15808 | A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm] |
| 11918 | The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar] |
| 11966 | If there are essential properties, how do you find out what they are? [Chisholm] |
| 12851 | Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Chisholm, by Simons] |
| 15806 | The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm] |
| 15826 | There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm] |
| 11963 | What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar] |
| 11965 | Could possible Adam gradually transform into Noah, and vice versa? [Chisholm] |
| 19569 | We have a basic epistemic duty to believe truth and avoid error [Chisholm, by Kvanvig] |
| 15819 | Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm] |
| 15816 | 'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book' [Chisholm] |
| 15817 | If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'? [Chisholm] |
| 15818 | So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them [Chisholm] |
| 8790 | The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying [Chisholm] |
| 15831 | Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm] |
| 11951 | Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar] |
| 11936 | The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar] |
| 11935 | Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar] |
| 15811 | I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself' [Chisholm] |
| 15815 | Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent' [Chisholm] |
| 15813 | People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence [Chisholm] |
| 15803 | Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process [Chisholm] |
| 3444 | If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person [Chisholm] |
| 3446 | For Hobbes (but not for Kant) a person's actions can be deduced from their desires and beliefs [Chisholm] |
| 15821 | Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition [Chisholm] |
| 9268 | If free will miraculously interrupts causation, animals might do that; why would we want to do it? [Frankfurt on Chisholm] |
| 11944 | Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar] |
| 20062 | If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong [Chisholm] |
| 20054 | There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent [Chisholm] |
| 3443 | Desires may rule us, but are we responsible for our desires? [Chisholm] |
| 3442 | Responsibility seems to conflict with events being either caused or not caused [Chisholm] |
| 15824 | There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission' [Chisholm] |
| 15822 | The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature [Chisholm] |
| 15823 | Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation' [Chisholm] |
| 11960 | Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar] |
| 11937 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar] |
| 11954 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar] |
| 3445 | Causation among objects relates either events or states [Chisholm] |
| 11961 | Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar] |
| 15820 | A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary [Chisholm] |
| 11959 | Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar] |
| 9448 | Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford] |
| 11930 | One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar] |
| 11957 | It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar] |
| 11921 | The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar] |
| 11931 | Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar] |