Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Roderick Firth, Keith Donnellan and Christine M. Korsgaard

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20 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan]
Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan]
'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
We are not conscious of pure liquidity, but of the liquidity of water [Firth]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
A person viewed as an agent makes no sense without its own future [Korsgaard]
To make sense of personal identity, focus on agency rather than experience [Korsgaard]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury]
Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan]
A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Theory of action focuses on explanation and prediction; practical action on justification and choice [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Maybe final value rests on the extrinsic property of being valued by a rational agent [Korsgaard, by Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard]
An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Self-concern may be a source of pain, or a lack of self-respect, or a failure of responsibility [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Personal concern for one's own self widens out into concern for the impersonal [Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
Contemplation is final because it is an activity which is not a process [Korsgaard]
For Aristotle, contemplation consists purely of understanding [Korsgaard]