68 ideas
| 18996 | A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo] |
| 3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
| 3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
| 3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
| 19006 | An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo] |
| 8859 | The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo] |
| 18999 | y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo] |
| 3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
| 19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
| 9138 | An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference [Yablo, by Sorensen] |
| 8865 | If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo] |
| 19002 | A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo] |
| 8863 | We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo] |
| 10580 | Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo] |
| 8862 | Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo] |
| 10579 | Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo] |
| 10577 | Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo] |
| 10578 | We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo] |
| 19489 | For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value [Yablo] |
| 19490 | Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures [Yablo] |
| 19491 | 'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds' [Yablo] |
| 8864 | We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo] |
| 19494 | Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo] |
| 8858 | Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo] |
| 14381 | A statue is essentially the statue, but its lump is not essentially a statue, so statue isn't lump [Yablo, by Rocca] |
| 18998 | Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo] |
| 19493 | Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo] |
| 3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
| 3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
| 3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
| 3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
| 6493 | We are not conscious of pure liquidity, but of the liquidity of water [Firth] |
| 3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
| 3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
| 8851 | Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M] |
| 19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo] |
| 3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
| 8849 | Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M] |
| 3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
| 8853 | Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M] |
| 3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
| 8855 | Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M] |
| 3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
| 3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
| 3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
| 3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
| 3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
| 3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
| 3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
| 3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
| 3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
| 3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
| 3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
| 3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
| 8852 | In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M] |
| 3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
| 3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
| 3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
| 19007 | A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo] |
| 18993 | If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo] |
| 19003 | Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo] |
| 10805 | A sentence should be recarved to reveal its content or implication relations [Yablo] |
| 18992 | Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo] |
| 3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
| 18994 | The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo] |
| 18997 | Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo] |
| 19005 | Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo] |
| 8861 | Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo] |