12 ideas
| 12801 | Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley] |
| 7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 19708 | Rational internal belief is conviction that a proposition enhances a belief system [Foley, by Vahid] |
| 12800 | Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley] |
| 12802 | We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley] |
| 12803 | Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley] |
| 7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 4921 | Quantum states in microtubules could bind brain activity to produce consciousness [Penrose] |