51 ideas
| 18877 | Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron] |
| 18868 | Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron] |
| 18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
| 18867 | Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron] |
| 18873 | God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron] |
| 15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron] |
| 18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
| 18879 | What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron] |
| 18880 | Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron] |
| 18874 | Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron] |
| 18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
| 15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
| 18869 | Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron] |
| 18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
| 18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
| 18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
| 18871 | I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron] |
| 18870 | Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron] |
| 17749 | Post proved the consistency of propositional logic in 1921 [Walicki] |
| 17765 | Propositional language can only relate statements as the same or as different [Walicki] |
| 17764 | Boolean connectives are interpreted as functions on the set {1,0} [Walicki] |
| 15102 | S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron] |
| 17752 | The empty set is useful for defining sets by properties, when the members are not yet known [Walicki] |
| 17753 | The empty set avoids having to take special precautions in case members vanish [Walicki] |
| 17759 | Ordinals play the central role in set theory, providing the model of well-ordering [Walicki] |
| 17741 | To determine the patterns in logic, one must identify its 'building blocks' [Walicki] |
| 17747 | A 'model' of a theory specifies interpreting a language in a domain to make all theorems true [Walicki] |
| 17748 | The L-S Theorem says no theory (even of reals) says more than a natural number theory [Walicki] |
| 17761 | A compact axiomatisation makes it possible to understand a field as a whole [Walicki] |
| 17763 | Axiomatic systems are purely syntactic, and do not presuppose any interpretation [Walicki] |
| 17758 | Ordinals are transitive sets of transitive sets; or transitive sets totally ordered by inclusion [Walicki] |
| 17755 | Ordinals are the empty set, union with the singleton, and any arbitrary union of ordinals [Walicki] |
| 17756 | The union of finite ordinals is the first 'limit ordinal'; 2ω is the second... [Walicki] |
| 17760 | Two infinite ordinals can represent a single infinite cardinal [Walicki] |
| 17757 | Members of ordinals are ordinals, and also subsets of ordinals [Walicki] |
| 17762 | In non-Euclidean geometry, all Euclidean theorems are valid that avoid the fifth postulate [Walicki] |
| 17754 | Inductive proof depends on the choice of the ordering [Walicki] |
| 18881 | For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron] |
| 18875 | Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron] |
| 18878 | Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron] |
| 18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
| 15401 | Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron] |
| 15393 | An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron] |
| 15396 | Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron] |
| 18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
| 17742 | Scotus based modality on semantic consistency, instead of on what the future could allow [Walicki] |
| 15103 | Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron] |
| 18872 | We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron] |
| 4921 | Quantum states in microtubules could bind brain activity to produce consciousness [Penrose] |
| 15104 | The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron] |
| 18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |