Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Roger Penrose, Ullin T. Place and James Pryor

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

9 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
8845 An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
8842 The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8843 Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor]
8844 Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
8846 Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
8847 Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
4921 Quantum states in microtubules could bind brain activity to produce consciousness [Penrose]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
18088 Intentionality is the mark of dispositions, not of the mental [Place]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
18089 Dispositions are not general laws, but laws of the natures of individual entities [Place]