26 ideas
20962 | Habermas seems to make philosophy more democratic [Habermas, by Bowie] |
15670 | The aim of 'post-metaphysical' philosophy is to interpret the sciences [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
15665 | We can do social philosophy by studying coordinated action through language use [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
20573 | Rather than instrumental reason, Habermas emphasises its communicative role [Habermas, by Oksala] |
20961 | What is considered a priori changes as language changes [Habermas, by Bowie] |
19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee] |
19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee] |
19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee] |
19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee] |
19555 | People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee] |
19557 | Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee] |
19556 | Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee] |
12890 | That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee] |
12892 | Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee] |
15667 | To understand a statement is to know what would make it acceptable [Habermas] |
15668 | Meaning is not fixed by a relation to the external world, but a relation to other speakers [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
15666 | To understand language is to know how to use it to reach shared understandings [Habermas] |
15677 | Moral right is linked to validity and truth, so morality is a matter of knowledge, not an expression of values [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
15672 | Actions norms are only valid if everyone possibly affected is involved in the discourse [Habermas] |
15671 | Move from individual willing of a general law, to willing norms agreed with other people [Habermas] |
15669 | People endorse equality, universality and inclusiveness, just by their communicative practices [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
23104 | Dworkin believed we should promote equality, to increase autonomy [Dworkin, by Kekes] |
23257 | We can treat people as equals, or actually treat them equally [Dworkin, by Grayling] |
18621 | Treating people as equals is the one basic value of all plausible political theories [Dworkin, by Kymlicka] |
23416 | Political involvement is needed, to challenge existing practices [Habermas, by Kymlicka] |
18639 | If we assess what people would buy in an imaginary insurance market, our taxes could copy it [Dworkin, by Kymlicka] |