78 ideas
| 12330 | In ontology, logic dominated language, until logic was mathematized [Badiou] |
| 9808 | Philosophy aims to reveal the grandeur of mathematics [Badiou] |
| 12318 | The female body, when taken in its entirety, is the Phallus itself [Badiou] |
| 13939 | No possible evidence could decide the reality of numbers, so it is a pseudo-question [Carnap] |
| 16252 | Metaphysics uses empty words, or just produces pseudo-statements [Carnap] |
| 12325 | Philosophy has been relieved of physics, cosmology, politics, and now must give up ontology [Badiou] |
| 12324 | Consensus is the enemy of thought [Badiou] |
| 10354 | Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts [Kusch] |
| 10353 | Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets [Kusch] |
| 12337 | There is 'transivity' iff membership ∈ also means inclusion ⊆ [Badiou] |
| 12321 | The axiom of choice must accept an indeterminate, indefinable, unconstructible set [Badiou] |
| 12342 | Topos theory explains the plurality of possible logics [Badiou] |
| 13342 | Carnap defined consequence by contradiction, but this is unintuitive and changes with substitution [Tarski on Carnap] |
| 12341 | Logic is a mathematical account of a universe of relations [Badiou] |
| 13251 | Each person is free to build their own logic, just by specifying a syntax [Carnap] |
| 9812 | In mathematics, if a problem can be formulated, it will eventually be solved [Badiou] |
| 12335 | Numbers are for measuring and for calculating (and the two must be consistent) [Badiou] |
| 12334 | There is no single unified definition of number [Badiou] |
| 12333 | Each type of number has its own characteristic procedure of introduction [Badiou] |
| 12322 | Must we accept numbers as existing when they no longer consist of units? [Badiou] |
| 9813 | Mathematics shows that thinking is not confined to the finite [Badiou] |
| 12327 | The undecidability of the Continuum Hypothesis may have ruined or fragmented set theory [Badiou] |
| 12329 | If mathematics is a logic of the possible, then questions of existence are not intrinsic to it [Badiou] |
| 12328 | Platonists like axioms and decisions, Aristotelians like definitions, possibilities and logic [Badiou] |
| 13936 | Questions about numbers are answered by analysis, and are analytic, and hence logically true [Carnap] |
| 8748 | Logical positivists incorporated geometry into logicism, saying axioms are just definitions [Carnap, by Shapiro] |
| 12331 | Logic is definitional, but real mathematics is axiomatic [Badiou] |
| 12340 | There is no Being as a whole, because there is no set of all sets [Badiou] |
| 9809 | Mathematics inscribes being as such [Badiou] |
| 12323 | Existence is Being itself, but only as our thought decides it [Badiou] |
| 12332 | The modern view of Being comes when we reject numbers as merely successions of One [Badiou] |
| 12326 | The primitive name of Being is the empty set; in a sense, only the empty set 'is' [Badiou] |
| 8960 | Internal questions about abstractions are trivial, and external ones deeply problematic [Carnap, by Szabó] |
| 9811 | It is of the essence of being to appear [Badiou] |
| 13933 | Existence questions are 'internal' (within a framework) or 'external' (concerning the whole framework) [Carnap] |
| 12320 | Ontology is (and always has been) Cantorian mathematics [Badiou] |
| 13934 | To be 'real' is to be an element of a system, so we cannot ask reality questions about the system itself [Carnap] |
| 13938 | A linguistic framework involves commitment to entities, so only commitment to the framework is in question [Carnap] |
| 13935 | We only accept 'things' within a language with formation, testing and acceptance rules [Carnap] |
| 14305 | In the truth-functional account a burnt-up match was soluble because it never entered water [Carnap] |
| 10337 | We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge [Kusch] |
| 10357 | Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind [Kusch] |
| 13932 | Empiricists tend to reject abstract entities, and to feel sympathy with nominalism [Carnap] |
| 13937 | New linguistic claims about entities are not true or false, but just expedient, fruitful or successful [Carnap] |
| 10339 | Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch] |
| 10331 | Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch] |
| 10338 | The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch] |
| 10340 | Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch] |
| 10345 | Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch] |
| 10350 | Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch] |
| 10343 | Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason [Kusch] |
| 10341 | Justification depends on the audience and one's social role [Kusch] |
| 10334 | Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics [Kusch] |
| 10336 | Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives [Kusch] |
| 10324 | Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge [Kusch] |
| 10327 | Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences [Kusch] |
| 10329 | Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories [Kusch] |
| 10330 | A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth [Kusch] |
| 10325 | Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism [Kusch] |
| 10335 | Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism [Kusch] |
| 10323 | Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people [Kusch] |
| 10348 | Private justification is justification to imagined other people [Kusch] |
| 18699 | Carnap tried to define all scientific predicates in terms of primitive relations, using type theory [Carnap, by Button] |
| 13940 | All linguistic forms in science are merely judged by their efficiency as instruments [Carnap] |
| 13048 | Good explications are exact, fruitful, simple and similar to the explicandum [Carnap, by Salmon] |
| 10349 | To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society [Kusch] |
| 10344 | Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself? [Kusch] |
| 12131 | All concepts can be derived from a few basics, making possible one science of everything [Carnap, by Brody] |
| 11968 | The intension of a sentence is the set of all possible worlds in which it is true [Carnap, by Kaplan] |
| 10358 | Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them [Kusch] |
| 12338 | We must either assert or deny any single predicate of any single subject [Badiou] |
| 18285 | All translation loses some content (but language does not create reality) [Carnap] |
| 9814 | All great poetry is engaged in rivalry with mathematics [Badiou] |
| 10333 | Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower [Kusch] |
| 12316 | For Enlightenment philosophers, God was no longer involved in politics [Badiou] |
| 10351 | Natural kinds are social institutions [Kusch] |
| 10332 | Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept [Kusch] |
| 12317 | The God of religion results from an encounter, not from a proof [Badiou] |