346 ideas
| 21875 | The wisdom of a free man is a meditation on life, not on death [Spinoza] |
| 17230 | If we are not wholly wise, we should live by good rules and maxims [Spinoza] |
| 9218 | Maybe what distinguishes philosophy from science is its pursuit of necessary truths [Sider] |
| 14721 | Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative [Sider] |
| 15010 | Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider] |
| 14977 | Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider] |
| 14994 | Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider] |
| 15003 | It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider] |
| 14986 | Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider] |
| 17200 | We must be careful to keep words distinct from ideas and images [Spinoza] |
| 17194 | Reason only explains what is universal, so it is timeless, under a certain form of eternity [Spinoza] |
| 4840 | Reason perceives things under a certain form of eternity [Spinoza] |
| 19917 | Without reason and human help, human life is misery [Spinoza] |
| 17213 | In so far as men live according to reason, they will agree with one another [Spinoza] |
| 4819 | There is necessarily for each existent thing a cause why it should exist [Spinoza] |
| 16541 | All the intrinsic properties of a thing should be deducible from its definition [Spinoza] |
| 14981 | Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider] |
| 15015 | It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider] |
| 21864 | Truth is its own standard [Spinoza] |
| 14992 | We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider] |
| 8018 | Spinoza's life shows that love of truth which he proclaims as the highest value [MacIntyre on Spinoza] |
| 5641 | For Spinoza, 'adequacy' is the intrinsic mark of truth [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
| 15012 | Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider] |
| 4816 | A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object [Spinoza] |
| 13689 | 'Theorems' are formulas provable from no premises at all [Sider] |
| 13705 | Truth tables assume truth functionality, and are just pictures of truth functions [Sider] |
| 13706 | Intuitively, deontic accessibility seems not to be reflexive, but to be serial [Sider] |
| 13710 | In D we add that 'what is necessary is possible'; then tautologies are possible, and contradictions not necessary [Sider] |
| 13711 | System B introduces iterated modalities [Sider] |
| 13708 | S5 is the strongest system, since it has the most valid formulas, because it is easy to be S5-valid [Sider] |
| 13712 | Epistemic accessibility is reflexive, and allows positive and negative introspection (KK and K¬K) [Sider] |
| 13714 | We can treat modal worlds as different times [Sider] |
| 13720 | Converse Barcan Formula: □∀αφ→∀α□φ [Sider] |
| 13718 | The Barcan Formula ∀x□Fx→□∀xFx may be a defect in modal logic [Sider] |
| 13723 | System B is needed to prove the Barcan Formula [Sider] |
| 15023 | The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider] |
| 13715 | You can employ intuitionist logic without intuitionism about mathematics [Sider] |
| 15004 | 'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider] |
| 14984 | Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider] |
| 14980 | There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider] |
| 15000 | 'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider] |
| 15020 | Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider] |
| 13678 | The most popular account of logical consequence is the semantic or model-theoretic one [Sider] |
| 13679 | Maybe logical consequence is more a matter of provability than of truth-preservation [Sider] |
| 13682 | Maybe logical consequence is impossibility of the premises being true and the consequent false [Sider] |
| 13680 | Maybe logical consequence is a primitive notion [Sider] |
| 15029 | Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider] |
| 13722 | A 'theorem' is an axiom, or the last line of a legitimate proof [Sider] |
| 20309 | If our ideas are adequate, what follows from them is also adequate [Spinoza] |
| 15019 | Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider] |
| 13696 | When a variable is 'free' of the quantifier, the result seems incapable of truth or falsity [Sider] |
| 13700 | A 'total' function must always produce an output for a given domain [Sider] |
| 13703 | λ can treat 'is cold and hungry' as a single predicate [Sider] |
| 13688 | Good axioms should be indisputable logical truths [Sider] |
| 13687 | No assumptions in axiomatic proofs, so no conditional proof or reductio [Sider] |
| 13690 | Proof by induction 'on the length of the formula' deconstructs a formula into its accepted atoms [Sider] |
| 13691 | Induction has a 'base case', then an 'inductive hypothesis', and then the 'inductive step' [Sider] |
| 15001 | 'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider] |
| 13685 | Natural deduction helpfully allows reasoning with assumptions [Sider] |
| 13686 | We can build proofs just from conclusions, rather than from plain formulae [Sider] |
| 13697 | Valuations in PC assign truth values to formulas relative to variable assignments [Sider] |
| 13684 | The semantical notion of a logical truth is validity, being true in all interpretations [Sider] |
| 13704 | It is hard to say which are the logical truths in modal logic, especially for iterated modal operators [Sider] |
| 13724 | In model theory, first define truth, then validity as truth in all models, and consequence as truth-preservation [Sider] |
| 13698 | In a complete logic you can avoid axiomatic proofs, by using models to show consequences [Sider] |
| 13699 | Compactness surprisingly says that no contradictions can emerge when the set goes infinite [Sider] |
| 17185 | Mathematics deals with the essences and properties of forms [Spinoza] |
| 17222 | The sum of its angles follows from a triangle's nature [Spinoza] |
| 17197 | The idea of a triangle involves truths about it, so those are part of its essence [Spinoza] |
| 13701 | A single second-order sentence validates all of arithmetic - but this can't be proved axiomatically [Sider] |
| 17174 | Outside the mind, there are just things and their properties [Spinoza] |
| 17176 | The more reality a thing has, the more attributes it has [Spinoza] |
| 17179 | There must always be a reason or cause why some triangle does or does not exist [Spinoza] |
| 14760 | Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category [Sider] |
| 17186 | Men say they prefer order, not realising that we imagine the order [Spinoza] |
| 15017 | Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider] |
| 15008 | Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider] |
| 15013 | Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider] |
| 15014 | Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider] |
| 20127 | Laws of nature are universal, so everything must be understood through those laws [Spinoza] |
| 15009 | We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider] |
| 13692 | A 'precisification' of a trivalent interpretation reduces it to a bivalent interpretation [Sider] |
| 13695 | Supervaluational logic is classical, except when it adds the 'Definitely' operator [Sider] |
| 13693 | A 'supervaluation' assigns further Ts and Fs, if they have been assigned in every precisification [Sider] |
| 13694 | We can 'sharpen' vague terms, and then define truth as true-on-all-sharpenings [Sider] |
| 14983 | Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider] |
| 13683 | A relation is a feature of multiple objects taken together [Sider] |
| 14978 | A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider] |
| 17170 | An 'attribute' is what the intellect takes as constituting an essence [Spinoza] |
| 14194 | Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider] |
| 17171 | A 'mode' is an aspect of a substance, and conceived through that substance [Spinoza] |
| 14995 | Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider] |
| 17195 | Things persevere through a force which derives from God [Spinoza] |
| 17206 | The essence of a thing is its effort to persevere [Spinoza] |
| 17192 | The 'universal' term 'man' is just imagining whatever is the same in a multitude of men [Spinoza] |
| 14745 | If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider] |
| 17188 | A thing is unified if its parts produce a single effect [Spinoza] |
| 5639 | Spinoza implies that thought is impossible without the notion of substance [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
| 21857 | Substance is the power of self-actualisation [Spinoza, by Lord] |
| 4813 | Substance is that of which an independent conception can be formed [Spinoza] |
| 14740 | If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider] |
| 14752 | Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider] |
| 14743 | The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider] |
| 14747 | 'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider] |
| 4828 | The essence of a thing is what is required for it to exist or be conceived [Spinoza] |
| 17187 | Essence gives existence and conception to things, and is inseparable from them [Spinoza] |
| 17191 | Nothing is essential if it is in every part, and is common to everything [Spinoza] |
| 17184 | All natures of things produce some effect [Spinoza] |
| 14757 | Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider] |
| 4869 | Experience does not teach us any essences of things [Spinoza] |
| 15026 | Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider] |
| 14727 | Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider] |
| 14738 | Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider] |
| 14726 | Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider] |
| 14728 | 4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider] |
| 14729 | 4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider] |
| 14730 | Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider] |
| 14731 | Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider] |
| 14758 | How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider] |
| 14762 | Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider] |
| 14741 | The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider] |
| 17205 | Only an external cause can destroy something [Spinoza] |
| 17175 | There cannot be two substances with the same attributes [Spinoza] |
| 13702 | The identity of indiscernibles is necessarily true, if being a member of some set counts as a property [Sider] |
| 14754 | If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider] |
| 17173 | Two substances can't be the same if they have different attributes [Spinoza] |
| 13721 | 'Strong' necessity in all possible worlds; 'weak' necessity in the worlds where the relevant objects exist [Sider] |
| 13707 | Maybe metaphysical accessibility is intransitive, if a world in which I am a frog is impossible [Sider] |
| 13709 | Logical truths must be necessary if anything is [Sider] |
| 17183 | Things are impossible if they imply contradiction, or their production lacks an external cause [Spinoza] |
| 4299 | Contingency is an illusion, resulting from our inadequate understanding [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
| 4824 | We only call things 'contingent' in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge [Spinoza] |
| 4839 | Reason naturally regards things as necessary, and only imagination considers them contingent [Spinoza] |
| 13716 | 'If B hadn't shot L someone else would have' if false; 'If B didn't shoot L, someone else did' is true [Sider] |
| 4822 | Divine nature makes all existence and operations necessary, and nothing is contingent [Spinoza] |
| 15030 | Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider] |
| 15031 | Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider] |
| 15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
| 15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
| 15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |
| 15025 | The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider] |
| 17182 | Necessity is in reference to essence or to cause [Spinoza] |
| 4818 | People who are ignorant of true causes imagine anything can change into anything else [Spinoza] |
| 20310 | Error does not result from imagining, but from lacking the evidence of impossibility [Spinoza] |
| 17208 | A horse would be destroyed if it were changed into a man or an insect [Spinoza] |
| 13717 | Transworld identity is not a problem in de dicto sentences, which needn't identify an individual [Sider] |
| 14763 | Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider] |
| 17209 | A thing is contingent if nothing in its essence determines whether or not it exists [Spinoza] |
| 13719 | Barcan Formula problem: there might have been a ghost, despite nothing existing which could be a ghost [Sider] |
| 5640 | Spinoza's three levels of knowledge are perception/imagination, then principles, then intuitions [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
| 17211 | Understanding is the sole aim of reason, and the only profit for the mind [Spinoza] |
| 12582 | The function of beliefs is to produce beliefs-that-p when p [Millikan] |
| 21801 | Unlike Descartes' atomism, Spinoza held a holistic view of belief [Spinoza, by Schmid] |
| 17193 | True ideas intrinsically involve the highest degree of certainty [Spinoza] |
| 21863 | You only know you are certain of something when you actually are certain of it [Spinoza] |
| 17199 | A man who assents without doubt to a falsehood is not certain, but lacks a cause to make him waver [Spinoza] |
| 5638 | 'I think' is useless, because it is contingent, and limited to the first person [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
| 4831 | If the body is affected by an external object, the mind can't help believing that the object exists [Spinoza] |
| 4865 | The eyes of the mind are proofs [Spinoza] |
| 20306 | Once we have experienced two feelings together, one will always give rise to the other [Spinoza] |
| 4835 | Anyone who knows, must know that they know, and even know that they know that they know.. [Spinoza] |
| 20308 | Encounters with things confuse the mind, and internal comparisons bring clarity [Spinoza] |
| 14988 | A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider] |
| 14982 | If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider] |
| 14989 | Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider] |
| 14997 | Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider] |
| 14990 | Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider] |
| 15005 | Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider] |
| 4312 | To understand a phenomenon, we must understand why it is necessary, not merely contingent [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
| 13073 | To understand the properties we must know the essence, as with a circle [Spinoza] |
| 15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
| 4833 | The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body [Spinoza] |
| 16198 | Knowledge is the essence of the mind [Spinoza] |
| 17198 | Will and intellect are the same thing [Spinoza] |
| 17201 | The will is finite, but the intellect is infinite [Spinoza] |
| 17196 | The will is not a desire, but the faculty of affirming what is true or false [Spinoza] |
| 21805 | Spinoza held that the mind is just a bundle of ideas [Spinoza, by Schmid] |
| 17204 | Animals are often observed to be wiser than people [Spinoza] |
| 17212 | To understand is the absolute virtue of the mind [Spinoza] |
| 15018 | Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider] |
| 21804 | Faculties are either fictions, or the abstract universals of ideas [Spinoza] |
| 4832 | If the body is affected by two things together, the imagining of one will conjure up the other [Spinoza] |
| 21869 | Our own force of persevering is nothing in comparison with external forces [Spinoza] |
| 20307 | As far as possible, everything tries to persevere [Spinoza] |
| 21803 | The conatus (striving) of mind and body together is appetite, which is the essence of man [Spinoza] |
| 4836 | The mind only knows itself by means of ideas of the modification of the body [Spinoza] |
| 21861 | Self-knowledge needs perception of the affections of the body [Spinoza] |
| 17216 | The poet who forgot his own tragedies was no longer the same man [Spinoza] |
| 4814 | A thing is free if it acts by necessity of its own nature, and the act is determined by itself alone [Spinoza] |
| 19922 | People are only free if they are guided entirely by reason [Spinoza] |
| 4871 | A thing is free if it acts only by the necessity of its own nature [Spinoza] |
| 21802 | An act of will can only occur if it has been caused, which implies a regress of causes [Spinoza] |
| 4837 | 'Free will' is a misunderstanding arising from awareness of our actions, but ignorance of their causes [Spinoza] |
| 4843 | Would we die if we lacked free will, and were poised between equal foods? Yes! [Spinoza] |
| 4844 | The mind is not free to remember or forget anything [Spinoza] |
| 4311 | We think we are free because we don't know the causes of our desires and choices [Spinoza] |
| 7828 | The actual world is the only one God could have created [Spinoza] |
| 21860 | Ideas and things have identical connections and order [Spinoza] |
| 4308 | Mind and body are one thing, seen sometimes as thought and sometimes as extension [Spinoza] |
| 4846 | We are incapable of formulating an idea which excludes the existence of our body [Spinoza] |
| 4834 | Mind and body are the same thing, sometimes seen as thought, and sometimes as extension [Spinoza] |
| 23951 | Emotion is a modification of bodily energy, controlling our actions [Spinoza] |
| 4849 | The three primary emotions are pleasure, pain and desire [Spinoza] |
| 23990 | The three primary emotions are pleasure, pain, and desire [Spinoza, by Goldie] |
| 17203 | Minds are subject to passions if they have inadequate ideas [Spinoza] |
| 4864 | An emotion is only bad if it hinders us from thinking [Spinoza] |
| 7832 | Stoics want to suppress emotions, but Spinoza overcomes them with higher emotions [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |
| 4863 | An emotion comes more under our control in proportion to how well it is known to us [Spinoza] |
| 4841 | People make calculation mistakes by misjudging the figures, not calculating them wrongly [Spinoza] |
| 21807 | Ideas are powerful entities, which can produce further ideas [Spinoza, by Schmid] |
| 4830 | An 'idea' is a mental conception which is actively formed by the mind in thinking [Spinoza] |
| 4842 | Ideas are not images formed in the brain, but are the conceptions of thought [Spinoza] |
| 20311 | An idea involves affirmation or negation [Spinoza] |
| 23801 | Biosemantics says content is useful mapping from a producer to a consumer system [Millikan, by Schulte] |
| 14999 | Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider] |
| 14998 | Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider] |
| 15016 | Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider] |
| 4838 | Claiming that actions depend on the will is meaningless; no one knows what the will is [Spinoza] |
| 4309 | Spinoza argues that in reality the will and the intellect are 'one and the same' [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
| 20305 | Whenever we act, then desire is our very essence [Spinoza] |
| 21868 | We love or hate people more strongly because we think they are free [Spinoza] |
| 17202 | We are the source of an action if only our nature can explain the action [Spinoza] |
| 21865 | We act when it follows from our nature, and is understood in that way [Spinoza] |
| 4870 | The most beautiful hand seen through the microscope will appear horrible [Spinoza] |
| 4867 | Whether nature is beautiful or orderly is entirely in relation to human imagination [Spinoza] |
| 21873 | Men only agree in nature if they are guided by reason [Spinoza] |
| 21872 | We seek our own advantage, and virtue is doing this rationally [Spinoza] |
| 17189 | The essence of man is modifications of the nature of God [Spinoza] |
| 17207 | By 'good' I mean what brings us ever closer to our model of human nature [Spinoza] |
| 8019 | Along with his pantheism, Spinoza equates ethics with the study of human nature [Spinoza, by MacIntyre] |
| 17229 | If infancy in humans was very rare, we would consider it a pitiful natural defect [Spinoza] |
| 4845 | We don't want things because they are good; we judge things to be good because we want them [Spinoza] |
| 17217 | Love is joy with an external cause [Spinoza] |
| 4848 | Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause [Spinoza] |
| 7833 | Spinoza names self-interest as the sole source of value [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |
| 17224 | If our ideas were wholly adequate, we would have no concept of evil [Spinoza] |
| 21870 | Music is good for a melancholic, bad for a mourner, and indifferent to the deaf [Spinoza] |
| 4860 | Man's highest happiness consists of perfecting his understanding, or reason [Spinoza] |
| 4847 | Pleasure is a passive state in which the mind increases in perfection [Spinoza] |
| 4859 | Pleasure is only bad in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action [Spinoza] |
| 4851 | Reason demands nothing contrary to nature, and so it demands self-love [Spinoza] |
| 17220 | Self-satisfaction is the highest thing for which we can hope [Spinoza] |
| 4852 | Both virtue and happiness are based on the preservation of one's own being [Spinoza] |
| 17214 | To act virtuously is to act rationally [Spinoza] |
| 21871 | The more we strive for our own advantage, the more virtuous we are [Spinoza] |
| 17210 | All virtue is founded on self-preservation [Spinoza] |
| 4856 | To live according to reason is to live according to the laws of human nature [Spinoza] |
| 17221 | A man ignorant of himself is ignorant of all of the virtues [Spinoza] |
| 17225 | In a free man, choosing flight can show as much strength of mind as fighting [Spinoza] |
| 17219 | A person unmoved by either reason or pity to help others is rightly called 'inhuman' [Spinoza] |
| 4857 | Pity is a bad and useless thing, as it is a pain, and rational people perform good deeds without it [Spinoza] |
| 17223 | Pity is not a virtue, but at least it shows a desire to live uprightly [Spinoza] |
| 17218 | People who live according to reason should avoid pity [Spinoza] |
| 17228 | Rational people judge money by needs, and live contented with very little [Spinoza] |
| 4853 | Rational people are self-interested, but also desire the same goods for other people [Spinoza] |
| 4858 | A rational person will want others to have the goods he seeks for himself [Spinoza] |
| 4855 | If people are obedient to reason, they will live in harmony [Spinoza] |
| 19935 | Peoples are created by individuals, not by nature, and only distinguished by language and law [Spinoza] |
| 21874 | The ideal for human preservation is unanimity among people [Spinoza] |
| 8020 | Only self-knowledge can liberate us [Spinoza, by MacIntyre] |
| 19914 | In nature everything has an absolute right to do anything it is capable of doing [Spinoza] |
| 19915 | Natural rights are determined by desire and power, not by reason [Spinoza] |
| 7412 | Spinoza extended Hobbes's natural rights to cover all possible desires and actions [Spinoza, by Tuck] |
| 7487 | Society exists to extend human awareness [Spinoza, by Watson] |
| 19943 | The state aims to allow personal development, so its main purpose is freedom [Spinoza] |
| 19930 | Sovereignty must include the power to make people submit to it [Spinoza] |
| 19936 | Kings tend to fight wars for glory, rather than for peace and liberty [Spinoza] |
| 19937 | Monarchs are always proud, and can't back down [Spinoza] |
| 19940 | Deposing a monarch is dangerous, because the people are used to royal authority [Spinoza] |
| 19931 | Every state is more frightened of its own citizens than of external enemies [Spinoza] |
| 19920 | Democracy is a legitimate gathering of people who do whatever they can do [Spinoza] |
| 19933 | If religion is law, then piety is justice, impiety is crime, and non-believers must leave [Spinoza] |
| 19938 | Allowing religious ministers any control of the state is bad for both parties [Spinoza] |
| 17227 | Slavery is a disgraceful crime [Spinoza] |
| 19923 | Slavery is not just obedience, but acting only in the interests of the master [Spinoza] |
| 19939 | Government is oppressive if opinions can be crimes, because people can't give them up [Spinoza] |
| 19944 | Without liberty of thought there is no trust in the state, and corruption follows [Spinoza] |
| 19942 | Treason may be committed as much by words as by deeds [Spinoza] |
| 19924 | The freest state is a rational one, where people can submit themselves to reason [Spinoza] |
| 7827 | Spinoza wanted democracy based on individual rights, and is thus the first modern political philosopher [Stewart,M on Spinoza] |
| 19926 | The sovereignty has absolute power over citizens [Spinoza] |
| 19918 | Forming a society meant following reason, and giving up dangerous appetites and mutual harm [Spinoza] |
| 19919 | People only give up their rights, and keep promises, if they hope for some greater good [Spinoza] |
| 19921 | Once you have given up your rights, there is no going back [Spinoza] |
| 19925 | In democracy we don't abandon our rights, but transfer them to the majority of us [Spinoza] |
| 19928 | No one, in giving up their power and right, ceases to be a human being [Spinoza] |
| 19929 | Everyone who gives up their rights must fear the recipients of them [Spinoza] |
| 19932 | The early Hebrews, following Moses, gave up their rights to God alone [Spinoza] |
| 19916 | The order of nature does not prohibit anything, and allows whatever appetite produces [Spinoza] |
| 19927 | State and religious law can clash, so the state must make decisions about religion [Spinoza] |
| 17226 | The best use of talent is to teach other people to live rationally [Spinoza] |
| 4854 | It is impossible that the necessity of a person's nature should produce a desire for non-existence [Spinoza] |
| 17215 | Animals feel, but that doesn't mean we can't use them for our pleasure and profit [Spinoza] |
| 17190 | We can easily think of nature as one individual [Spinoza] |
| 4826 | Nature has no particular goal in view, and final causes are mere human figments [Spinoza] |
| 1587 | Spinoza strongly attacked teleology, which is the lifeblood of classical logos [Roochnik on Spinoza] |
| 1588 | For Spinoza eyes don't act for purposes, but follow mechanical necessity [Roochnik on Spinoza] |
| 12731 | Final causes are figments of human imagination [Spinoza] |
| 4821 | An infinite line can be marked in feet or inches, so one infinity is twelve times the other [Spinoza] |
| 17177 | In nature there is just one infinite substance [Spinoza] |
| 4850 | A final cause is simply a human desire [Spinoza] |
| 4815 | From a definite cause an effect necessarily follows [Spinoza] |
| 14985 | The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider] |
| 14987 | Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider] |
| 14725 | Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time [Sider] |
| 14991 | Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider] |
| 14735 | Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation [Sider] |
| 15021 | The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider] |
| 15024 | The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider] |
| 14722 | Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not [Sider] |
| 14756 | For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description [Sider] |
| 14724 | Presentists must deny truths about multiple times [Sider] |
| 14723 | Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance [Sider] |
| 14736 | The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider] |
| 14734 | The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider] |
| 7835 | The key question for Spinoza is: is his God really a God? [Stewart,M on Spinoza] |
| 17231 | God feels no emotions, of joy or sorrow [Spinoza] |
| 21859 | God has no purpose, because God lacks nothing [Spinoza] |
| 12928 | Spinoza's God is just power and necessity, without perfection or wisdom [Leibniz on Spinoza] |
| 7571 | Spinoza's God is not a person [Spinoza, by Jolley] |
| 4314 | God is wholly without passions, and strictly speaking does not love anyone [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
| 7609 | God is the sum and principle of all eternal laws [Spinoza, by Armstrong,K] |
| 19435 | God is not loveable for producing without choice and by necessity; God is loveable for his goodness [Leibniz on Spinoza] |
| 17172 | God is a substance with infinite attributes [Spinoza] |
| 4823 | God does not act according to the freedom of the will [Spinoza] |
| 4866 | God is a being with infinite attributes, each of them infinite or perfect [Spinoza] |
| 7829 | God no more has human perfections than we have animal perfections [Spinoza] |
| 4825 | To say that God promotes what is good is false, as it sets up a goal beyond God [Spinoza] |
| 21856 | Spinoza says a substance of infinite attributes cannot fail to exist [Spinoza, by Lord] |
| 17178 | Denial of God is denial that his essence involves existence, which is absurd [Spinoza] |
| 21858 | God is being as such, and you cannot conceive of the non-existence of being [Spinoza, by Lord] |
| 4820 | God must necessarily exist, because no reason can be given for his non-existence [Spinoza] |
| 17169 | Some things makes me conceive of it as a thing whose essence requires its existence [Spinoza] |
| 4817 | If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence [Spinoza] |
| 4868 | Trying to prove God's existence through miracles is proving the obscure by the more obscure [Spinoza] |
| 4827 | Priests reject as heretics anyone who tries to understand miracles in a natural way [Spinoza] |
| 12757 | That God is the substance of all things is an ill-reputed doctrine [Leibniz on Spinoza] |
| 4829 | The human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God [Spinoza] |
| 17181 | God is the efficient cause of essences, as well as of existences [Spinoza] |
| 17180 | Everything is in God, and nothing exists or is thinkable without God [Spinoza] |
| 7830 | A talking triangle would say God is triangular [Spinoza] |
| 7836 | In Spinoza, one could substitute 'nature' or 'substance' for the word 'God' throughout [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |
| 19934 | Hebrews were very hostile to other states, who had not given up their rights to God [Spinoza] |
| 4300 | The Bible has nothing in common with reasoning and philosophy [Spinoza] |
| 7831 | Spinoza's theory of mind implies that there is no immortality [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |
| 21876 | After death, something eternal remains of the mind [Spinoza] |