Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Ryan Wasserman, Alan Sidelle and G.A. Cohen

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
15169 Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it) [Sidelle]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
15164 We seem to base necessities on thought experiments and imagination [Sidelle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
15180 There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts [Sidelle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
16065 Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman]
16067 Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman]
16069 There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
16068 The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
15184 Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
15172 Clearly, essential predications express necessary properties [Sidelle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
15181 Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
15173 That the essence of water is its microstructure is a convention, not a discovery [Sidelle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
15185 We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle]
16074 Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
15175 Evaluation of de dicto modalities does not depend on the identity of its objects [Sidelle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
15032 Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider]
15179 To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
15171 The necessary a posteriori is statements either of identity or of essence [Sidelle]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
15167 Empiricism explores necessities and concept-limits by imagining negations of truths [Sidelle]
15177 Contradictoriness limits what is possible and what is imaginable [Sidelle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
15176 The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention [Sidelle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
15174 A thing doesn't need transworld identity prior to rigid reference - that could be a convention of the reference [Sidelle]
15183 'Dthat' operates to make a singular term into a rigid term [Sidelle]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
15165 A priori knowledge is entirely of analytic truths [Sidelle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
15168 That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water' [Sidelle]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
15166 Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
15182 Because some entities overlap, reference must have analytic individuation principles [Sidelle]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
21733 The right-wing conception of freedom is based on the idea of self-ownership [Cohen,GA]
21739 Plenty of people have self-ownership, but still lack autonomy [Cohen,GA]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
21736 It is doubtful whether any private property was originally acquired legitimately [Cohen,GA]
21734 It is plausible that no one has an initial right to own land and natural resources [Cohen,GA]
21735 Every thing which is now private started out as unowned [Cohen,GA]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
15178 Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers? [Sidelle]