Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Ryan Wasserman, Anon (Par) and Ned Block

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26 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
16065 Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman]
16067 Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman]
16069 There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
16068 The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
16074 Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
22142 In future, only logical limits can be placed on divine omnipotence [Anon (Par), by Boulter]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
16716 It is heresy to require self-evident foundational principles in order to be certain [Anon (Par)]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
2584 Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
6172 The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
2582 A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2574 Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2576 In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block]
2575 Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block]
2583 You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
2578 Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block]
2585 Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block]
2586 In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
2579 Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / b. Turing Machines
2577 Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine [Block]
2580 A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state [Block]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
3178 A fast machine could pass all behavioural tests with a vast lookup table [Block, by Rey]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
18033 The meaning of a representation is its role in thought, perception or decisions [Block]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
2581 Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not [Block]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
1866 It is heresy to teach that history repeats every 36,000 years [Anon (Par)]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
1865 It is heresy to teach that natural impossibilities cannot even be achieved by God [Anon (Par)]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
1864 It is heresy to teach that we can know God by his essence in this mortal life [Anon (Par)]