Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Ryan Wasserman, Bernecker / Dretske and Julia Annas

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
12036 Xenophanes began the concern with knowledge [Annas]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
12046 Plato was the first philosopher who was concerned to systematize his ideas [Annas]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
16065 Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman]
16067 Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman]
16069 There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
16068 The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
16074 Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
3756 Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
3757 Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
3759 You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
3752 Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
3753 Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
3754 Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
3755 Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
3761 Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
3760 Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3758 Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
3546 'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
12037 Euripides's Medea is a key case of reason versus the passions [Annas]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
3547 Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development [Annas]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 3. Cyrenaic School
3543 Cyrenaics pursue pleasure, but don't equate it with happiness [Annas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
12040 Virtue is a kind of understanding of moral value [Annas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
3541 Ancient ethics uses attractive notions, not imperatives [Annas]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
3550 Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
3551 Virtue theory tries to explain our duties in terms of our character [Annas]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
3552 If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic [Annas]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
3542 We should do good when necessary, not maximise it [Annas]