19 ideas
2764 | Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J] |
8820 | Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock] |
19080 | Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO] |
8819 | We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock] |
16065 | Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman] |
16067 | Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman] |
16069 | There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman] |
16068 | The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman] |
16074 | Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman] |
8822 | Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock] |
8818 | Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock] |
8811 | What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock] |
8817 | Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock] |
8814 | Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock] |
8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
8813 | If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock] |
8812 | Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock] |
8816 | Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock] |
8815 | Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock] |