15 ideas
14596 | Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr] |
14597 | Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr] |
16065 | Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman] |
16067 | Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman] |
16069 | There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman] |
16068 | The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman] |
14221 | Serious essentialism says everything has essences, they're not things, and they ground necessities [Shalkowski] |
14222 | Essences are what it is to be that (kind of) thing - in fact, they are the thing's identity [Shalkowski] |
14226 | We distinguish objects by their attributes, not by their essences [Shalkowski] |
14225 | Critics say that essences are too mysterious to be known [Shalkowski] |
16074 | Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman] |
14223 | De dicto necessity has linguistic entities as their source, so it is a type of de re necessity [Shalkowski] |
14598 | Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr] |
9220 | Lewis must specify that all possibilities are in his worlds, making the whole thing circular [Shalkowski, by Sider] |
14224 | Equilateral and equiangular aren't the same, as we have to prove their connection [Shalkowski] |