Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Ryan Wasserman, David-Hillel Ruben and Gary Kemp

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17 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman]
Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman]
There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp]
We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp]
The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp]