Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Ryan Wasserman, John Dupr and John Duns Scotus

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46 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
The concept of being has only one meaning, whether talking of universals or of God [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
Being (not sensation or God) is the primary object of the intellect [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Duns Scotus, by Pasnau]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
'Unity' is a particularly difficult word, because things can have hidden unity [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus]
Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being' [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Matter and form give true unity; subject and accident is just unity 'per accidens' [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman]
Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman]
There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré]
It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Augustine's 'illumination' theory of knowledge leads to nothing but scepticism [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré]
Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré]
Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré]
Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré]
Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré]
Wales may count as fish [Dupré]
Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré]
The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
The concept of God is the unique first efficient cause, final cause, and most eminent being [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
We can't infer the infinity of God from creation ex nihilo [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]