Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Ryan Wasserman, Joseph Almog and Lamargue,P/Olson,SH

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

20 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
17867 If a concept is not compact, it will not be presentable to finite minds [Almog]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
17877 The number series is primitive, not the result of some set theoretic axioms [Almog]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
16065 Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman]
16067 Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman]
16069 There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
16068 The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17871 Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind [Almog]
17866 Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths [Almog]
17868 Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases [Almog]
17872 Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
17870 Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
17869 Kripke and Putnam offer an intermediary between real and nominal essences [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
17876 Individual essences are just cobbled together classificatory predicates [Almog]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
16074 Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
17873 Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers [Almog]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
20327 Modern attention has moved from the intrinsic properties of art to its relational properties [Lamarque/Olson]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
20326 Early 20th cent attempts at defining art focused on significant form, intuition, expression, unity [Lamarque/Olson]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 7. Ontology of Art
20330 The dualistic view says works of art are either abstract objects (types), or physical objects [Lamarque/Olson]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
17864 Defining an essence comes no where near giving a thing's nature [Almog]
17863 Essences promise to reveal reality, but actually drive us away from it [Almog]