Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Ryan Wasserman, Jrgen Habermas and E Conee / R Feldman

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
20962 Habermas seems to make philosophy more democratic [Habermas, by Bowie]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
15670 The aim of 'post-metaphysical' philosophy is to interpret the sciences [Habermas, by Finlayson]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 5. Critical Theory
15665 We can do social philosophy by studying coordinated action through language use [Habermas, by Finlayson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
20573 Rather than instrumental reason, Habermas emphasises its communicative role [Habermas, by Oksala]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
16065 Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman]
16067 Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman]
16069 There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
16068 The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
16074 Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
19525 If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right) [Conee/Feldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
20961 What is considered a priori changes as language changes [Habermas, by Bowie]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19524 We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs [Conee/Feldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19518 Evidentialism says justifications supervene on the available evidence [Conee/Feldman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
15667 To understand a statement is to know what would make it acceptable [Habermas]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
15668 Meaning is not fixed by a relation to the external world, but a relation to other speakers [Habermas, by Finlayson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
15666 To understand language is to know how to use it to reach shared understandings [Habermas]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
15677 Moral right is linked to validity and truth, so morality is a matter of knowledge, not an expression of values [Habermas, by Finlayson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
19519 Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally [Conee/Feldman]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
15672 Actions norms are only valid if everyone possibly affected is involved in the discourse [Habermas]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 9. Contractualism
15671 Move from individual willing of a general law, to willing norms agreed with other people [Habermas]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
15669 People endorse equality, universality and inclusiveness, just by their communicative practices [Habermas, by Finlayson]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
23416 Political involvement is needed, to challenge existing practices [Habermas, by Kymlicka]