Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Ryan Wasserman, William Poundstone and Michael Smith

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman]
Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman]
There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M]
Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M]
A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M]
Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M]
Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M]
If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M]
Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M]
A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M]
We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]
A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]
'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Self-interest can fairly divide a cake; first person cuts, second person chooses [Poundstone]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 6. Game Theory
Formal game theory is about maximising or minimising numbers in tables [Poundstone]
The minimax theorem says a perfect game of opposed people always has a rational solution [Poundstone]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 7. Prisoner's Dilemma
Two prisoners get the best result by being loyal, not by selfish betrayal [Poundstone]
The tragedy in prisoner's dilemma is when two 'nice' players misread each other [Poundstone]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
Do unto others as you would have them do unto you - or else! [Poundstone]
TIT FOR TAT says cooperate at first, then do what the other player does [Poundstone]