17 ideas
| 9052 | Vague predicates lack application; there are no borderline cases; vague F is not F [Unger, by Keefe/Smith] |
| 16070 | There are no objects with proper parts; there are only mereological simples [Unger, by Wasserman] |
| 16065 | Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman] |
| 16067 | Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman] |
| 16069 | There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman] |
| 16068 | The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman] |
| 16074 | Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman] |
| 8724 | The meaning of 'know' does not change from courtroom to living room [Unger] |
| 8722 | No one knows anything, and no one is ever justified or reasonable [Unger] |
| 8723 | An evil scientist may give you a momentary life, with totally false memories [Unger] |
| 22717 | Self-interest can fairly divide a cake; first person cuts, second person chooses [Poundstone] |
| 22718 | Formal game theory is about maximising or minimising numbers in tables [Poundstone] |
| 22719 | The minimax theorem says a perfect game of opposed people always has a rational solution [Poundstone] |
| 22720 | Two prisoners get the best result by being loyal, not by selfish betrayal [Poundstone] |
| 22721 | The tragedy in prisoner's dilemma is when two 'nice' players misread each other [Poundstone] |
| 22722 | TIT FOR TAT says cooperate at first, then do what the other player does [Poundstone] |
| 22723 | Do unto others as you would have them do unto you - or else! [Poundstone] |