126 ideas
| 16000 | Fixed ideas should be tackled aggressively [Kierkegaard] |
| 7578 | I conceived it my task to create difficulties everywhere [Kierkegaard] |
| 22087 | Philosophy fails to articulate the continual becoming of existence [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
| 22047 | Wherever there is painless contradiction there is also comedy [Kierkegaard] |
| 16012 | Philosophy can't be unbiased if it ignores language, as that is no more independent than individuals are [Kierkegaard] |
| 13407 | All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau] |
| 22092 | Kierkegaard's truth draws on authenticity, fidelity and honesty [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
| 18486 | We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride] |
| 15999 | Pure truth is for infinite beings only; I prefer endless striving for truth [Kierkegaard] |
| 22094 | Subjective truth can only be sustained by repetition [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
| 16005 | I recognise knowledge, but it is the truth by which I can live and die that really matters [Kierkegaard] |
| 5651 | Traditional views of truth are tautologies, and truth is empty without a subject [Kierkegaard, by Scruton] |
| 20313 | The highest truth we can get is uncertainty held fast by an inward passion [Kierkegaard] |
| 18484 | Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride] |
| 18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
| 18481 | Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride] |
| 18473 | 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride] |
| 18483 | The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride] |
| 18479 | There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride] |
| 18477 | There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride] |
| 18482 | Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride] |
| 18485 | Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride] |
| 18474 | Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride] |
| 18490 | Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride] |
| 18493 | Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride] |
| 18489 | Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride] |
| 18476 | 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride] |
| 8923 | Numbers are identified by their main properties and relations, involving the successor function [MacBride] |
| 8926 | For mathematical objects to be positions, positions themselves must exist first [MacBride] |
| 16007 | I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard] |
| 18480 | Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride] |
| 18471 | Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride] |
| 18472 | Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride] |
| 18475 | Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride] |
| 3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
| 13409 | Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau] |
| 21354 | It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it [MacBride] |
| 21353 | Internal relations are fixed by existences, or characters, or supervenience on characters [MacBride] |
| 21352 | 'Multigrade' relations are those lacking a fixed number of relata [MacBride] |
| 16013 | Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard] |
| 18478 | Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride] |
| 12583 | Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur [Papineau] |
| 13406 | A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau] |
| 7871 | Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification [Papineau] |
| 13408 | Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau] |
| 7852 | The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau] |
| 7864 | Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau] |
| 7873 | Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs [Papineau] |
| 7874 | Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau] |
| 7882 | Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar [Papineau] |
| 7854 | Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau] |
| 7889 | Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau] |
| 7891 | We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau] |
| 7890 | Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau] |
| 7885 | The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau] |
| 7886 | Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau] |
| 7887 | States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau] |
| 7888 | Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau] |
| 20742 | The real subject is ethical, not cognitive [Kierkegaard] |
| 16002 | The self is a combination of pairs of attributes: freedom/necessity, infinite/finite, temporal/eternal [Kierkegaard] |
| 7860 | The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau] |
| 7862 | Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau] |
| 3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
| 3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
| 7870 | Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role [Papineau] |
| 7858 | If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical [Papineau] |
| 3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
| 3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
| 7865 | Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau] |
| 7892 | The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity [Papineau] |
| 3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
| 7879 | Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau] |
| 20971 | Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau] |
| 7856 | It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau] |
| 7881 | Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought [Papineau] |
| 3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
| 7866 | Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau] |
| 7850 | Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it [Papineau] |
| 7851 | Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states [Papineau] |
| 16369 | There is a single file per object, memorised, reactivated, consolidated and expanded [Papineau, by Recanati] |
| 7884 | Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau] |
| 7863 | If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions? [Papineau] |
| 7883 | Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions [Papineau] |
| 13410 | Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau] |
| 7872 | Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track [Papineau] |
| 7869 | Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities [Papineau] |
| 7868 | Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true [Papineau] |
| 3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |
| 22098 | Socrates neglects the gap between knowing what is good and doing good [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
| 22086 | The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
| 15998 | Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard] |
| 16003 | If people marry just because they are lonely, that is self-love, not love [Kierkegaard] |
| 7579 | While big metaphysics is complete without ethics, personal philosophy emphasises ethics [Kierkegaard] |
| 7581 | Speculative philosophy loses the individual in a vast vision of humanity [Kierkegaard] |
| 22090 | For me time stands still, and I with it [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
| 22096 | Anxiety is not a passing mood, but a response to human freedom [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
| 22097 | The ultimate in life is learning to be anxious in the right way [Kierkegaard] |
| 21909 | Ultimate knowledge is being anxious in the right way [Kierkegaard] |
| 20758 | Anxiety is staring into the yawning abyss of freedom [Kierkegaard] |
| 9305 | The plebeians bore others; only the nobility bore themselves [Kierkegaard] |
| 21910 | Our destiny is the highest pitch of world-weariness [Kierkegaard] |
| 5650 | Reason is just abstractions, so our essence needs a subjective 'leap of faith' [Kierkegaard, by Scruton] |
| 22095 | There are aesthetic, ethical and religious subjectivity [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
| 20314 | People want to lose themselves in movements and history, instead of being individuals [Kierkegaard] |
| 7582 | Becoming what one is is a huge difficulty, because we strongly aspire to be something else [Kierkegaard] |
| 20747 | What matters is not right choice, but energy, earnestness and pathos in the choosing [Kierkegaard] |
| 16001 | Life may be understood backwards, but it has to be lived forwards [Kierkegaard] |
| 22093 | Life is a repetition when what has been now becomes [Kierkegaard] |
| 16009 | When we seek our own 'freedom' we are just trying to avoid responsibility [Kierkegaard] |
| 22091 | Kierkegaard prioritises the inward individual, rather than community [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
| 7853 | Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs [Papineau] |
| 7857 | Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau] |
| 20976 | The completeness of physics cannot be proved [Papineau] |
| 20974 | Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces [Papineau] |
| 20970 | Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role [Papineau] |
| 20975 | Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy [Papineau] |
| 7586 | God does not think or exist; God creates, and is eternal [Kierkegaard] |
| 16006 | Either Abraham rises higher than universal ethics, or he is a mere murderer [Kierkegaard] |
| 7577 | Abraham was willing to suspend ethics, for a higher idea [Kierkegaard] |
| 20312 | God cannot be demonstrated objectively, because God is a subject, only existing inwardly [Kierkegaard] |
| 7580 | Pantheism destroys the distinction between good and evil [Kierkegaard] |
| 20735 | We need to see that Christianity cannot be understood [Kierkegaard] |
| 16008 | The best way to be a Christian is without 'Christianity' [Kierkegaard] |
| 7584 | Without risk there is no faith [Kierkegaard] |
| 22088 | Faith is like a dancer's leap, going up to God, but also back to earth [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
| 7583 | Faith is the highest passion in the sphere of human subjectivity [Kierkegaard] |