13 ideas
| 3534 | To be is to have causal powers [Alexander,S] |
| 14963 | Surely the past phases of a thing are not parts of the thing? [Broad] |
| 14759 | A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad] |
| 11842 | If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad] |
| 7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
| 21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
| 21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
| 14494 | Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished [Alexander,S] |
| 3398 | Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S] |
| 18671 | The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing] |
| 8160 | The present and past exist, but the future does not [Broad, by Dummett] |
| 14609 | We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad] |
| 22933 | We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad] |